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MACNIVEN V. WESTMORELAND AND TAX
ADVICE:
USING “PURPOSIVE TEXTUALISM” TO
DEAL WITH TAX SHELTERS AND PROMOTE
LEGITIMATE TAX ADVICE
SCOTT A. SCHUMACHER
The last few years have seen a flurry of activity aimed at the tax shelter industry. Beginning
with the “covered opinion” rules of Treasury Circular 230 in 2005, the government has adopted
several changes to the standards applicable to tax advice, all in an effort to stop abusive tax shelters.
Recently, both Congress (in 2007) and the Treasury (in 2008) have revised the standards applicable
to tax advice to require that a position have a “more likely than not” chance of succeeding on the
merits, or the position must be disclosed to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). While the
government’s desire for reform is understandable, these changes will not stop abusive shelters and
will make giving legitimate tax advice more difficult. Moreover, these changes will also not succeed
in what should be their ultimate goal—providing guidance for distinguishing between legitimate tax
planning and abusive tax avoidance.
My thesis in this Article is that whatever rules Congress, the Treasury, and the courts employ,
these rules should be designed to encourage tax advice and to encourage that the advice given is
proper. Our tax system is based on voluntary compliance, which requires a well-informed and welladvised citizenry. The recent amendments will, I fear, stifle tax advice, including legitimate advice.
By the same token, the overly aggressive prior standard for tax advice of “realistic possibility of
success” encouraged hyper-textualism and led too many advisors and their clients to review a
position on a “can I get away with this” analysis, rather than honestly attempting to comply with the
law.
The standard that I propose is what I refer to as “purposive textualism” and is taken from the
British House of Lords’ opinion by Lord Hoffmann in MacNiven v. Westmoreland. Under the
MacNiven analysis, one must analyze the “constructive purpose” of the tax statute and then
determine whether the relevant provision of the statute, upon its true construction, applies to the
facts at issue. While the House of Lords referred to this standard as “purposive construction,” the
standard is more akin to the modern textualism that looks at the purpose of the statute in the context
that Congress (or Parliament) enacted it. In my view, the MacNiven formulation gives us the most
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principled basis for determining what is an abusive tax shelter and what is legitimate tax planning.
It is also a workable construction for tax advisors. It is my hope that a discussion of the MacNiven
opinion will offer a different perspective on the issue of tax shelters and tax advice and bring a fresh
debate to these issues.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The last few years have seen a flurry of activity aimed at the tax shelter
industry.1 Beginning with the ―covered opinion‖ rules of Treasury Circular

1. This flurry of activity has, of course, included numerous articles by tax scholars. See, e.g.,
Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the Search for a Silver Bullet, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1939 (2005); Noel B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax
Shelters, 24 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2004); Brian Galle, Interpretative Theory and Tax Shelter Regulation,
26 VA. TAX REV. 357 (2006); Michael L. Schler, Ten More Truths About Tax Shelters: The Problem,
Possible Solutions, and a Reply To Professor Weisbach, 55 TAX L. REV. 325 (2002). It is therefore
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230,2 the government has adopted several changes to the standards applicable
to tax advice, all in an effort to stop abusive tax shelters. Recently, both
Congress (in 2007) and the Treasury (in 2008)3 revised the standards
applicable to tax advice to require that the position have a ―more likely than
not‖ chance of succeeding on the merits, or the position must be disclosed to
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).4
While the government‘s desire for reform is understandable, these
changes will not stop abusive shelters and will make the giving of legitimate
tax advice more difficult. 5 More importantly, these changes will not succeed
in what should be their ultimate goal—providing guidance for distinguishing
between legitimate tax planning and abusive tax avoidance. 6 Indeed, what
often gets lost in the discussion of tax shelters is the fact that the vast majority
of taxpayers are trying to comply with the law and that their advisors are
doing their best to inform their clients about what the law provides.
Moreover, the new anti-shelter initiatives rely primarily upon disclosure and
penalties to root out abusive schemes. 7 But, as others have noted, disclosure
is not the solution. 8
In addition, recent court decisions are unlikely to be helpful in providing
guidance to advisors and helping them determine whether a position is ―more
likely than not‖ to be successful. While the economic substance and business
purpose doctrines, at least in their current iterations, may generally provide

with more than mild trepidation that I wade into this area with yet another article on tax shelters.
2. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35 (2007).
3. Many of the administrative actions in this area have been taken by the Treasury Department,
the Internal Revenue Service, or both. For simplicity‘s sake, I will refer to the Treasury Department
and the IRS collectively as the Treasury.
4. These recent legislative and administrative activities elevated the standard for r eturn advice
to more likely than not. See, e.g., U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans‘ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq
Accountability Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 110-28, § 8246(b)(2)(B), 121 Stat. 200 (2007). If the
advisor cannot reach this relatively high standard, the position must be disclosed.
5. Randolph E. Paul warned of this problem in 1937 when he advised: ―Care should also be
used in the selection of measures to prevent avoidance which will not bear down unduly upon those
who are not avoiding taxes. Taxing statutes are usually, and perhaps must always for constitutional
reasons be, put in general terms, and the effect of some measures directed at tax-avoidance
mechanisms is often . . . to cause, ‗like Herod‘s massacre,‘ great suffering without reaching the
particular cases which inspired it.‖ RANDOLPH E. P AUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION :
TAXATION WITHOUT MISREPRESENTATION 65 (1937) (footnotes omitted).
6. In making this statement, I reject the contention of Professor David Weisbach that all tax
planning is necessarily abusive and creates nothing of value. See David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths
About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 222 (2002).
7. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 6011, 6694, 6707A (West 2007); 26 U.S.C. §§ 6707, 6708 (2000 &
Supp. V 2005).
8. See, e.g., Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1942; David M. Schizer, Enlisting the Tax
Bar, 59 TAX L. REV. 331, 369, 370 (2006).
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the correct result to the case at hand, 9 they offer little constructive guidance to
distinguish between tax planning and tax abuse. 10 Indeed, while some
transactions are invalidated because they lack economic substance apart from
tax savings, many transactions that are entered into solely for tax purposes are
acceptable under the tax laws.11 The economic substance and business
purpose analyses used by courts offer little in the way of guidance for future
cases.
My thesis in this Article is that whatever rules Congress, the Treasury, and
the courts employ, these rules should be designed to encourage tax advice and
to encourage that the advice given is proper. The system, whatever it is, must
work with or at least co-opt tax professionals. Given the low audit coverage,
in order for the tax system to work with any modicum of efficiency, tax
professionals must be encouraged to properly advise their clients on what the
law is. 12 The recent amendments do just the opposite.
Ultimately, whether the analysis is being done by a tax attorney, the IRS,
or a federal judge, the task should be to determine what the law is and what
Congress intended. The overly aggressive ―realistic possibility of success‖
and ―reasonable basis‖ standards for tax advice encouraged hyper-textualism
and led too many advisors and their clients to review a position on a ―can I get
away with this‖ analysis, rather than honestly attempting to comply with the
law. On the other hand, selectively imposing economic realism on the tax
system, a system that is based in large part on legal and fiscal fictions,
provides no guidance to taxpayers or their advisors and may indeed add to the
cynicism surrounding the tax system. 13
9. However, the different treatment by various courts suggests that the analysis under these
tests is more of an art form than a science.
10. Every case seems to turn on the Potter Stewart pornography test of ―I know it when I see
it.‖ Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (not ―trying to define what
may be indefinable . . . [b]ut I know it when I see it‖); see also ACM P‘ship v. Comm‘r, 157 F.3d
231, 265 (3d Cir. 1998) (McKee, J., dissenting) (―I can‘t help but suspect that the majority‘s
conclusion . . . is, in its essence, something akin to a ‗smell test.‘‖).
11. See, e.g., tax-free reorganizations, 26 U.S.C. § 368 (2000); tax-free exchanges of property,
26 U.S.C. § 1031 (2000 & Supp. V 2005); Subchapter Selections, 26 U.S.C.A. § 1362 (West 2007);
Qualified Terminable Interest Property (QTIP) elections, 26 U.S.C. § 2056(b) (2000); the annual
exclusion for gift tax purposes, 26 U.S.C. § 2503(b) (2000); just to name a few.
12. See Richard Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers: Co-Opting the Tax Bar into Dissuading
Corporate Tax Shelters, 21 VA. TAX REV. 43, 73 (2001).
13. The staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation has identified three ways in which the
increase in shelter activity has adversely impacted the administration of the tax laws. First, the
limited audit resources of the IRS have been diverted to focus on tax shelters. Second, the courts
have been burdened by a substantial increase in the number of pending cases. Third, the rise of the
tax-shelter industry may have contributed significantly to the general deterioration in compliance by
undermining taxpayer confidence in the fairness and effectiveness of the tax laws. STAFF OF J.
COMM. ON TAX‘N, 98TH CONG., PROPOSALS RELATING TO TAX SHELTERS AND OTHER TAXMOTIVATED TRANSACTIONS 6 (Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter PROPOSALS RELATING TO TAX
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The standard that I propose is what I will refer to as ―purposive
textualism‖14 and is taken from the British House of Lords‘ opinion by Lord
Hoffmann in MacNiven v. Westmoreland.15 Under this analysis, one must
analyze the ―constructive purpose‖ of the tax statute and then determine
whether the transaction at issue is consistent with that statutory purpose. In
my view, the MacNiven formulation gives us the most principled basis for
determining what is an abusive tax shelter and what is legitimate tax planning.
It is also a workable construction for tax advisors, which, if employed
appropriately, should provide for legitimate tax advice to clients.
Part II of this Article will deal with how we got to where we are, the rise
of the mega-shelter industry, and how the realistic possibility of success
standard and the economics of the system led to this problem. 16 This part will
trace the role of tax advisors in the tax system from the adoption of the
income tax to the present. What I hope to show is that the prior system
encouraged aggressive tax positions across the board and led, 17 at least in part,
to the tax shelter wars we are mired in today. While this antebellum regimen
may have been appropriate at the time, 18 it is no longer sustainable.
Part III will look at the recent rules adopted and proposed by the
government to deal with shelters. While a whole host of provisions are in
play here, I will focus on the new provisions that are emblematic of the efforts
of Congress and the Treasury, namely the covered opinion rules of Circular
230 and the revisions to the opinion standards by amended § 6694 of Title 26
of the U.S. Code. In this part, I will show why the current efforts are not an
answer to the problem and will, in fact, create larger problems.
Finally, in Part IV of the Article, I will discuss what the standard should
be. The House of Lords, in MacNiven, provides us with a method for
SHELTERS].
14. As discussed more fully infra Part IV.B, there has, of course, been much written on the
differences and similarities of the textualist and purposive approach to statutory interpretation. See,
e.g., John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists From Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70
(2006). My use of the phrase ―purposive textualism‖ is not meant to diminish the distinction
between these two schools. Rather, it is a description of the methodology employed by the House of
Lords in MacNiven and is designed to highlight the new paradigm in textualism as recognized by
Professor Manning. MacNiven v.Westmoreland, [2001] UKHL 6, [2003] 1 A.C. 311, ¶ 29 (UKHC).
15. MacNiven, [2003] 1 A.C. 311, ¶¶ 19–75.
16. It is only by examining the shelter problem in full (or at least, fullish) context that a suitable
resolution can be found.
17. And by ―prior system‖ I mean the rules and standards prior to 2005, when the covered
opinion rules of the Department of Treasury § 10.35 of Circular No. 230 were adopted, which in my
view altered the tax landscape for good. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35 (2007). One could certainly pick another
date or event to demarcate the ―Tax BCE,‖ but this date seems as good as any.
18. Some scholars have argued that the realistic possibility of success standard was misguided
from its launch. See, e.g., Theodore C. Falk, Tax Ethics, Legal Ethics, and Real Ethics: A Critique of
ABA Formal Opinion 85-352, 39 TAX LAW. 643, 643 (1986).
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analyzing tax statutes, which in turn leads to a workable standard for tax
advice. While the House of Lords referred to this standard as ―purposive
construction,‖ in my view the standard is more akin to the modern textualism
that looks at the purpose of the statute in the context that Congress (or
Parliament) enacted it. While the issues and analysis employed by the Lord
Justices in MacNiven have much in common with the opinions of some U.S.
courts, it is nevertheless my hope that a review of that opinion will offer a
different perspective on the issue of tax shelters and tax advice and bring a
fresh debate to these issues. I am not so naïve as to think that my new
standard will be the answer to all of the ills that face tax practice or that it is a
―silver bullet.‖19 However, like the introduction of the MacNiven decision
into the tax shelter debate in the United States, I hope my analysis will move
the debate in a salubrious direction.
II. HOW DID WE GET HERE?
And you may ask yourself
Am I right? . . . Am I wrong?
And you may tell yourself
MY GOD! . . . WHAT HAVE I DONE?20
For most of the relatively brief history of the income tax, tax lawyers were
given wide latitude to advise clients, with few standards governing advice,
save the general standards of the ABA. 21 When standards were eventually
adopted by the government, the standards were comparatively lax.22 Those
standards have recently been replaced by a more draconian regime. 23 This
part traces the history of tax compliance and tax lawyers‘ roles in that system.
A. Tax Avoidance and the Nature of the Tax Law
Even prior to the enactment of the income tax in 1913, tax avoidance was
an issue for the government, the courts, and lawyers.
The people who used the tax on tea as the spark to ignite a revolution and
who had included in their constitution a prohibition against any direct tax by
19. See Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1951 (attempting to mold a ―silver bullet‖ to
attack shelters).
20. TALKING HEADS, Once in a Lifetime, on REMAIN IN LIGHT (Warner Bros. Records 1980).
21. The original thirty-two Canons of Professional Ethics were adopted by the American Bar
Association in 1908. See Preface to MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY, at ix (1986).
22. Treas. Dep‘t Cir. No. 230 § 10.22 (2007); 31 C.F.R. § 10.2(w) (1938) (requiring tax
professionals to exercise ―due diligence‖ in preparing and advising on tax return positions); Treas.
Dep‘t Cir. No. 230 § 10.34 (2007); 31 C.F.R. § 10.34 (1994) (requiring a realistic chance of success
on the merits, defined as a one-in-three chance of success).
23. See infra Part III.
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their federal government were not likely to discuss morality and taxes in the
same breath. The tax collector was an intruder, and if you could escape his
clutches, you were in the same fortunate position as someone who had
escaped smallpox or diphtheria.24
In one of the first cases to address the issue of tax avoidance, the Supreme
Court held that if the tax avoidance ―is carried out by the means of legal
forms, it is subject to no legal censure.‖25 While this formalistic approach
may have stemmed in part from the anti-tax history of the United States, it is
also the result of the nature of the tax laws. 26
In constructing the right ethical model for tax advice, one must begin with
the premise that tax planning and minimization are both inevitable and
unavoidable. I do not use these terms in a fatalistic sense that all men are evil
and that there are insufficient resources to rid us of the scourge of tax
avoidance. 27 Rather, tax planning and minimization are unavoidable because
the tax laws are necessarily an exercise in line drawing.28 As Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes stated, ―[W]hen the law draws a line, a case is on one side of
it or the other, and if on the safe side is none the worse legally that a party has
availed himself to the full of what the law permits.‖29 Thus, the line drawing
that is inherent in tax law inevitably causes taxpayers and their advisors to
plan their affairs to fall on one side of the law or the other. 30
This idea is developed by the oft-quoted statement regarding taxes, that of
Judge Learned Hand: ―Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall
be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best
pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one‘s taxes.‖ 31
As with Justice Holmes‘s averment, Judge Hand‘s statement is not a
normative judgment, nor is it, as many shelter promoters and others have
argued, ―a license to circumvent rules on the claim of assisting taxpayers in so
24. See Merle H. Miller, Morality in Tax Planning, 10 INST. ON FED. TAX ‘N 1067, 1068
(1952).
25. United States v. Isham, 84 U.S. 496, 506 (1873).
26. Norris Darrell, Responsibilities of the Lawyer in Tax Practice, reprinted in PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 87, 100 (Boris I. Bittker ed., 1970) (―It is for the
government to determine what taxes should be paid and in what circumstances. . . . To infer that
there is something morally wrong with avoiding tax in a legitimate way, there being no fraud, deceit
or make-believe, is pure hypocrisy.‖).
27. Much of the law surrounding this is based on Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes‘s bad man
theory of law. See Falk, supra note 18, at 648.
28. See PAUL, supra note 5, at 19 (―As long as taxes are imposed, there will be transactions in
which the tax will be greater one way than another way, or in which one way will be above the
suspicion attaching to another way.‖).
29. Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625, 630 (1916).
30. See PAUL, supra note 5, at 101; Francis C. Oatway, Motivation and Responsibility in Tax
Practice: The Need for Definition, 20 TAX L. REV. 237, 252 (1965).
31. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934).
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arranging their affairs.‖32 Rather, it is a statement regarding the nature of the
tax laws.33 This must be fully understood in formulating an appropriate
ethical standard for tax lawyers. Tax minimization, or arranging one‘s affairs
in such a way to comply with the tax laws, or however one wants to
characterize it, is a necessary part of the tax lawyer‘s role. 34 Policy makers
must recognize the inevitability of tax advice and tax minimization in
formulating appropriate standards so as to ensure both that tax advice is given
and that the advice given is proper.
In addition, unlike other areas of the law that arguably have a moral
component to them, there is nothing inherently moral or immoral in the tax
laws.35 As one commentator stated,
If there are two bridges across a river, one a toll bridge and
the other free, both leading to the same destination, there is
no moral reason whatsoever why the traveler shouldn‘t
choose the free one. If the law permits a taxpayer to arrange
to make a profit in such a way that it is taxable as capital gain
and not as ordinary income, there is no moral reason
whatsoever why he shouldn‘t do it.36
Thus, the tax laws either permit a certain deduction or they do not.37
There is no touchstone, apart from the law itself, requiring a taxpayer to
pay a certain amount of tax.38 There is no absolute right amount of tax or a
32. Linda M. Beale, Putting SEC Heat on Audit Firms and Corporate Tax Shelters:
Responding to Tax Risk with Sunshine, Shame and Strict Liability, 29 J. CORP. L. 219, 241 n.114
(2004).
33. Darrell, supra note 26.
34. Randolph E. Paul, The Lawyer as a Tax Adviser, 25 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 412, 415 (1953).
35. One of the most famous quotes in this regard is from J.P. Morgan, who stated, ―Income tax
evasion is a legal, not a moral question. Anyone has a right to do anything the law does not say is
wrong.‖ BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE, at xxxii (3d
ed. 1995).
36. Darrell, supra note 26, at 100.
37. See, e.g., Mark H. Johnson, Does the Tax Practitioner Owe a Dual Responsibility to His
Client and to the Government—The Theory, 15 S. CAL. TAX INST. 25, 26 (1963) (―No taxpayer can
be asked to pay a tax which he considers to be ‗fair‘ under some abstract code of morality. An
absolute requisite is a rule book—a written set of rules whose meaning is reasonably clear and
explicit.‖).
38. There is, of course, a question as to whether the law, simply because it is the law, must be
followed. As a result, the arbitrary provisions of the revenue laws are, and just as importantly are
perceived as, quite distant from clear mandates such as ―thou shall not kill‖ or ―no parking vehicles
in the park.‖ Thus, on a more theoretical or philosophical level is the question of whether we are
bound to follow the law merely because it is the law. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 594 (1958). This issue has been picked up by
Professors Joseph Raz and John Finnis, among others, who have carried the debate forward. John
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pure amount of tax. Certainly being straight and honest with the government
should be required, but that only begs the question as to what constitutes
being straight and honest with the government. 39 Thus, despite Justice
Holmes‘s aphorism, ―I like to pay taxes. With them I buy civilization,‖ 40 not
even the most pro-tax individual can decide what is the ―correct‖ amount of
tax. There is no correct amount of tax independent of what Congress has
declared it to be.41
B. The Role of Tax Advisors in Tax Planning
While tax law is inherently an exercise in line drawing, the line drawn by
Congress has not always been crystalline.42 Given that taxpayers are required
to pay only their ―fair share,‖ who decides what that amount is? Professor
Finnis, The Authority of Law in the Predicament of Contemporary Social Theory, 1 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL‘Y 115, 115–16 (1984); Joseph Raz, The Obligation to Obey: Revision and
Tradition, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL‘Y 139, 139, 140, 141 (1984). Professor Raz‘s
position is that there is no inherent justification for following the law merely because it is the law,
and citizens are entitled to question the validity of even duly enacted laws. Id. at 141. While the vast
majority of citizens have never heard of Professor Raz, let alone read his work, it appears that most
Americans are rather Razian in their attitudes toward the tax code.
39. See Tony Honoré, The Dependence of Morality on Law, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5
(1993).
According to most people‘s moral outlook members of a community should
make a contribution to the expense of meeting collective needs. . . . So members
of a community have in principle a moral obligation to pay taxes. But this
obligation is incomplete or, if one prefers inchoate, apart from law. It has no
real content until the amount or rate of tax is fixed by an institutional decision,
by law. What amounts to a reasonable contribution is not otherwise
determinable, since what is required is a co-ordinated scheme which can be
defended as fair not merely in the aggregate amount it raises but in its
distribution. Taxpayers cannot settle it for themselves, as people can within
limits settle for themselves, say, the proper way of showing respect for the
feelings of others. Apart from law no one has a moral obligation to pay any
particular amount of tax. An obligation to pay an indeterminate sum is not an
effective obligation; it requires only a disposition, not an action. So, apart from
law no one has an effective obligation to pay tax.
Id.
40. FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 42–43 (1938).
41. Nor, practically, can one really pay more tax than is due. Section 6402 of the Internal
Revenue Code requires the government, subject to the limitations of § 6402, to refund any
overpayment to the taxpayer. 26 U.S.C. § 6402 (2000); see also Jones v. Liberty Glass Co., 332 U.S.
524, 531 (1947) (―[W]e read the word ‗overpayment‘ in its usual sense, as meaning any payment in
excess of that which is properly due. . . . Whatever the reason, the payment of more than is rightfully
due is what characterizes an overpayment.‖).
42. Judge Learned Hand said about the income tax that the words that otherwise seem to
―dance before [our] eyes in a meaningless procession: cross-reference to cross-reference, exception
upon exception—couched in abstract terms that offer no handle to seize hold of.‖ Learned Hand,
Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 169 (1947).
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Judith Freedman cogently argues that obviously it should not be the taxpayer
who makes this determination.43 Resolving these ambiguities is delegated, at
least in the first instance, to tax advisors. This highlights the fundamental role
tax advisors play in the tax system. Tax attorneys and accountants help
clients navigate the murky waters of the tax code and help taxpayers
understand what the law requires. 44 Tax advisors also provide clients with
creative solutions to limit their tax liabilities and with protection from
accuracy related penalties if the tax plan does not work out as designed. This
ability to ―add value‖ has encouraged the more risk-tolerant and wealthy
taxpayers to take positions that are not legitimate and to pay large fees for the
advice.
From the beginning of the income tax, there have always been those who
will seek to pay as little as possible. The battle cry of the American
Revolution was not ―liberté, égalité, fraternité,‖ but rather, ―no taxation
without representation.‖45 Public opinion polls have consistently shown a
hostility toward taxes and the IRS.46 This disdain for income taxes cuts across
ideological and political lines and reflects the public‘s dislike of government
and the programs funded by the government.47 Thus, whether you are an antiwar liberal or a pro-life conservative, you can find some reason not to want to

43. Judith Freedman, Defining Taxpayer Responsibility: In Support of a General AntiAvoidance Principle, BRIT. TAX REV., July–Aug. 2004, at 332, 334 (―It is inevitable that there will
be fundamental tensions between the essential need of governments to raise revenue and the lack of
desire of taxpayers to pay for this. Quite apart from differences about the size and role of the state,
which are obviously to be decided in the ballot box in a democratic society, each taxpayer will
consider that he should pay only his ‗fair share.‘ What is his fair share may be a matter for argument,
but what is clear is that the taxpayer himself is ‗not the proper person to decide what it should be.‘‖
(footnote omitted)).
44. Robert H. Jackson, Changes in Treasury Tax Policy, 12 TAXES 342, 343 (―In applying a
technical law which few have read, and voluminous regulations known to fewer, and opinions and
decisions some of which are not even published, errors will be made, differences of opinion will
arise.‖).
45. This is not to imply that tax shelters or the desire to pay less taxes is a uniquely American
phenomenon. See, e.g., Donald L. Korb, Shelters, Schemes, and Abusive Transactions: Why Today’s
Thoughtful U.S. Tax Advisors Should Tell Their Clients to “Just Say No,” in J-736 TAX STRATEGIES
FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN -OFFS, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS ,
REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS 409, 411–12 (Practising Law Institute 2006) (recounting tax
dodges throughout history since the times of ancient Rome). Moreover, my solution to the shelter
problem is based in large part upon the House of Lords‘ decision in MacNiven v.Westmoreland,
[2001] UKHL 6, [2003] 1 A.C. 311 (UKHC).
46. See Samuel A. Donaldson, The Easy Case Against Tax Simplification, 22 VA. TAX REV.
645, 692 nn.206–07 (2003).
47. In two Fox News/Opinion Dynamics polls taken in 2002 and 2005, between seventy-one
percent and seventy-five percent of respondents objected to how their tax dollars were spent, rather
than the amount of taxes they paid. The poll is available at http://www.pollingreport.com/budget.htm
(last visited Nov. 13, 2008).
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fully fund the government. 48 Another public sentiment is that while only
fourteen percent have ever been even tempted to cheat on their own taxes,
these same people believe that thirty-nine percent of their neighbors are
cheating on their taxes.49 Thus, there is a belief that only a fool pays his full
amount of tax, or as Leona Helmsley so eloquently stated, ―Only the little
people pay taxes.‖50 And there is a belief that if we only find the right tax
advisor, we will only be required to pay that which we are constitutionally
obligated to forfeit.51
The imposition of penalties and the role of tax attorneys in shielding
clients from these penalties must be emphasized. While it is true that tax
lawyers are lawyers who happen to specialize in a given area (i.e., tax), tax
lawyers‘ ability to insulate their clients from penalties, merely by giving them
advice, is unusual in law.52 Thus, the normal generalizations and positive
exhortations of the rules of professional conduct are insufficient for tax
advice. Tax lawyers hold the key to understanding the tax laws and to
protecting clients from penalties, and financial incentives have usually caused
lawyers to side with clients. Whatever rules or standards are adopted must
take into account the tax lawyer‘s unique role in the tax system.
C. Standards Applicable to Tax Advice
Unlike many legal specialties, tax lawyers do not have a venerable
tradition to compel adherence to fixed ethical rules. 53 Indeed, in an article
from 1953, Randolph Paul states that until that time, ―very few tax lawyers
48. Freedman, supra note 43, at 337 (noting the same attitude in United Kingdom).
49. Blum
&
Weprin/NBC
poll,
April
2005,
available
at
http://www.pollingreport.com/budget.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2008).
50. The Associated Press, Maid Testifies Helmsley Denied Paying Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, July 12,
1989, at B2 (quoting Leona Helmsley).
51. See Miller, supra note 24, at 1074 (―Most people think of us as having a bag of tricks that
greatly reduces our clients‘ taxes and probably gets us out altogether on our own.‖).
52. See, e.g., People v. Nat‘l Ass‘n of Realtors, 202 Cal. Rptr. 243, 248 (Ct. App. 1984)
(rejecting defense to civil penalties of reliance on advice of counsel).
53. Compare the archetypical duties of the zealous advocate, summarized by Lord Brougham in
1821 in his defense of Queen Caroline:
An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the
world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and
expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and amongst them, to
himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not
regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others.
JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTICE 342
(2005) (citing Gerald F. Uelmen, Lord Brougham’s Bromide: Good Lawyers as Bad Citizens, 30
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 119, 120 (1996)). The lawyer-as-zealous-advocate standard has played a
significant role, perhaps too significant, in the formulation of standards of conduct relating to tax
return advice.
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[even gave] much thought to the ethics that should govern‖ the profession and
that there was no clear set of guidelines governing how tax advice should be
dispensed.54 Despite the fact that the Treasury had been given authority in
1884 to promulgate rules of practice before it,55 the Treasury did little to
dictate the rules applicable to tax professionals in rendering return advice.
The original version of Circular 230 did not contain any standards for advice
or preparations of returns; 56 the first version of Circular 230 to include any
standard regarding tax advice did not appear until 1938.57 Even then, the
standard required practitioners only to ―exercise due diligence‖ in preparing
or assisting in the preparation of returns and other documents.58 This standard
appeared to require tax professionals to do some independent investigation but
did not set forth any criteria regarding how ambiguities in the statute should
be resolved.59 However, given the complexity of the tax laws and the broad
application of these arcane statutes, disputes with the IRS as to how the Code
should be interpreted were bound to occur. And, given that penalties were
imposed for failure to follow the dictates of the Code, the issue of the
standards applicable to taxpayers and their advisors would inevitably come to
the fore.
Negligence penalties were first added to the Code in 1918.60 The penalty
was a modest five percent of the total amount of the deficiency and applied
where an understatement was ―due to negligence on the part of the taxpayer,
but without intent to defraud,‖61 or there was an ―intentional disregard of
authorized rules and regulations with knowledge thereof.‖62 However, if the
return was ―made in good faith and the understatement of the amount in the
return [wa]s not due to any fault of the taxpayer,‖ no penalty would be
imposed because of the understatement. 63

54. Paul, supra note 34, at 412.
55. 23 Stat. 258 (1884). Indeed, it took more than 100 years for the Treasury to issue final
regulations that provided any real standards governing the rendering of tax advice. See 31 C.F.R. §
10.34 (1994); T.D. 8545, 59 Fed. Reg. 31,523 (1994); 1994-2 C.B. 415.
56. Circular 230 is the collection of rules governing practice before the Treasury. Rev. Rul.
230, 4-1600A C.B. 408 (1921).
57. 31 C.F.R. § 10.2(w) (1938).
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 250(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1083. For an excellent history of the
negligence penalty and other tax penalties, see Donald Arthur Winslow, Tax Penalties—“They Shoot
Dogs, Don’t They?,” 43 FLA. L. REV. 811, 821–54 (1991).
61. Revenue Act of 1918 § 250(b).
62. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 250(b), 42 Stat. 265.
63. Id.; Revenue Act of 1918 § 250(b); see also Winslow, supra note 60, at 836–40.
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When cases requiring application of these standards reached the courts,
the resulting analyses, while conclusory, 64 nevertheless were the foundation
for the ―reasonable basis‖ and ―substantial authority‖ standards, and endorsed
the efficacy of disclosure in eluding penalties. For example, in Senner v.
Commissioner,65 the Board of Tax Appeals held that the petitioner should not
be held liable for negligence because the issues ―are questions concerning
which petitioner had reasonable grounds to differ from the conclusions
reached by the respondent.‖66 In Heffelfinger v. Commissioner,67 the Board
refused to impose negligence penalties for intentional disregard of rules and
regulations but without intent to defraud where the evidence showed that the
petitioner ―honestly believed‖ that he had properly reported the income at
issue and because an ―explanation was given of why the income was not
reported by the petitioner.‖68 The Board reaffirmed the conclusions in these
two cases in its decision in Davis Regulator Co. v. Commissioner69 and held
that ―where full disclosure is made and the taxpayer has ‗reasonable grounds
to differ from the conclusion‘ of the Commissioner that a tax is due, the
negligence penalty should not be imposed.‖ 70 Finally, in Brockman Building
Corp. v. Commissioner,71 the Tax Court held that the Commissioner erred in
determining that the petitioner was liable for negligence penalties because the
petitioner attached a rider to its return, the return was prepared by a certified
public accountant, and the petitioner had a ―good faith,‖ ―bona fide‖ belief, all
of which amounted to ―reasonable cause.‖ 72
Thus, as originally formulated by the courts, insulation from penalties was
based on the reasonableness of the taxpayer‘s actions, 73 which could be
demonstrated by, among other things, reliance on the advice of a professional
and disclosure.74 The courts did not address the standards tax professionals
must use in giving advice to clients, but it appears that underlying these

64. The conclusory nature of this analysis persists to the current day. See, e.g., Osteen v.
Comm‘r, 62 F.3d 356, 358 (11th Cir. 1995) (chastising the Tax Court for its conclusory application
of the substantial understatement and substantial authority provisions).
65. 22 B.T.A. 655 (1931).
66. Id. at 658.
67. 32 B.T.A. 1232 (1935).
68. Id. at 1235.
69. 36 B.T.A. 437 (1937).
70. Id. at 444 (citing Senner, 22 B.T.A. at 658; Heffelfinger, 32 B.T.A. at 1232).
71. 21 T.C. 175 (1953).
72. Id. at 191.
73. As Professors Boris Bittker and Martin McMahon noted, ―[S]ince negligence is the
antithesis of reasonable behavior, a showing of reasonable cause for the underpayment in effect
negates the existence of negligence.‖ BORIS I. BITTKER & MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR., FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ¶ 45.3 (1988); see also Winslow, supra note 60, at 839.
74. See Brockman Building Corp., 21 T.C. at 191.
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standards was the assumption that taxpayers and their advisors were
attempting to find the right answer, or at least had an honest dispute with the
IRS as to how the law should be interpreted.75
The first standards applicable to tax lawyers came not from the Treasury
or the courts, but from the ABA. 76 Formal Opinion 314 covers several
matters, including whether the IRS is a tribunal, 77 as well as what duties are
owed to the IRS.78 Regarding the standards applicable to rendering tax advice
to clients, the opinion provides that
a lawyer who is asked to advise his client in the course of the
preparation of the client‘s tax returns may freely urge the
statement of positions most favorable to the client just as long
as there is reasonable basis for those positions. Thus where
the lawyer believes there is a reasonable basis for a position
that a particular transaction does not result in taxable income,
or that certain expenditures are properly deductible as
expenses, the lawyer has no duty to advise that riders be
attached to the client‘s tax return explaining the
circumstances surrounding the transaction or the
expenditures. 79
Thus, the first standard applicable to attorneys giving tax return advice was
the ―reasonable basis‖ test.80 If the lawyer believed that there was a
reasonable basis for a return position, the lawyer could freely advise that
position and was not required to advise the client to disclose that position. 81
Formal Opinion 314 was subject almost immediately to criticism. 82 The
reasonable basis standard was described by notable commentators as
75. See id.; Heffelfinger v. Comm‘r, 32 B.T.A. 1232, 1234–35 (1935).
76. See ABA Comm. on Prof‘l Ethics, Formal Op. 314 (1965).
77. The ABA opined that the ―Internal Revenue Service is neither a true tribunal, nor even a
quasi-judicial institution.‖ Id.
78. Quoting various Canons of Ethics, Formal Opinion 314 provides that the lawyer may not
mislead the IRS, conceal facts, or commit fraud, and ―should strive at all times to uphold the honor
and to maintain the dignity of the profession.‖ Id. (quoting ABA CANONS OF PROF‘L ETHICS Canon
29 (1967)).
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Comm. on Tax Policy, Tax Section N.Y. State Bar Ass‘n, A Report on Complexity
and the Income Tax, 27 TAX L. REV. 325, 330 (1972); Falk, supra note 18, at 644–45; James R.
Rowen, When May a Lawyer Advise a Client that He May Take a Position on His Tax Return?, 29
TAX LAW. 237, 244 (1976). Formal Opinion 85-352 notes the ―persistent criticism by distinguished
members of the tax bar, IRS officials and members of Congress.‖ ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‘l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985).
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―anything you can articulate without laughing,‖83 or as any position that can
be adopted ―with little more than a chuckle.‖ 84 More fundamentally, the
reasonable basis standard appeared to allow attorneys to advise a position that
they did not believe to be correct, as long as it was ―reasonable,‖ which might
well be inconsistent with the taxpayer‘s statement in the jurat.85 Opinion 314
also began with the premise that the IRS and tax lawyers are adversaries.
―Accordingly, it viewed a tax return as a submission in an adversary
proceeding and the lawyer‘s ethical obligations of candor and zeal as
essentially those of an advocate.‖86
The next development in the standards applicable to taxpayers and their
advisors was the 1982 enactment of the substantial understatement penalty. 87
Under these new penalties, a taxpayer would be liable for a twenty-percent
penalty if the understatement of tax was substantial.88 The amount of the
understatement could be reduced if there was substantial authority for the
treatment or if the item was adequately disclosed. 89 Known as the ―audit
lottery‖ penalty, the substantial understatement penalty was designed to
―create downside risk for taxpayers who take aggressive, undisclosed
positions.‖90 This development in the law regarding penalties called into
question the reasonable basis standard of Formal Opinion 314. Could a
lawyer advise a client to take a position on a return that did not have
substantial authority and advise the taxpayer not to disclose the position?
Doing so would, in essence, allow a lawyer to advise a client to take a
position that might subject the client to penalties.
The Treasury‘s response was that a lawyer could not ethically advise such
a position. 91 In proposed regulations amending Circular 230, the Treasury
83. Falk, supra note 18, at 644 (quoting Ethics Opinion 314 and Tax Shelters Addressed at
ABA Meeting, 22 TAX NOTES 757 (1984)).
84. James P. Holden, New Professional Standards in the Tax Market Place: Opinions 314, 346
and Circular 230, 4 VA. TAX REV. 209, 235 (1985) (quoting Bernard Wolfman, Remarks During
Panel Discussion on ABA Formal Op. 314 Made at ABA Section of Taxation 1984 Midyear Meeting
(Feb. 11, 1984)).
85. See Rowen, supra note 82, at 250.
86. Falk, supra note 18, at 646.
87. 26 U.S.C. § 6661 (1982) (repealed 1989).
88. An understatement is substantial if it exceeds the greater of ten percent of the amount of tax
shown on the return or $5,000. See 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(1)(A) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
89. Id. § 6662(d)(2)(B) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
90. Falk, supra note 18, at 658 (citing Pascaner & Wolff, What Are the Professional’s
Responsibilities Under the Substantial Understatement Rules?, 35 PRAC. ACCT. 392 (1985); John
André LeDuc, The Legislative Response of the 97th Congress to Tax Shelters, the Audit Lottery, and
Other Forms of Intentional or Reckless Noncompliance, 18 TAX NOTES 363, 382–83 (1983));
Harvey M. Silets, TEFRA Penalties in Action, in 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY -THIRD INSTITUTE
ON FEDERAL TAXATION 9-1 (1985).
91. 51 Fed. Reg. 29,113, 29,113–14 (Aug. 14, 1986).
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made its first attempt to provide more guidance on the meaning of ―due
diligence‖ and stated that a practitioner should not, in the exercise of due
diligence, place his or her client in a position of being assessed any of the
accuracy-related penalties. 92 The proposed regulations were also premised on
the Treasury‘s concern that the ethical standards of some practitioners
regarding tax advice had eroded over the years.93 The Treasury believed this
led to serious problems concerning taxpayer compliance with the revenue
laws, which adversely affected the integrity of the voluntary, self-assessment
tax system. 94 The proposed regulations would have required a practitioner
only to recommend positions that were ―supported by substantial authority‖;
otherwise the relevant facts were required to be disclosed. 95
These proposed regulations were never adopted as final regulations. After
the substantial understatement penalties were enacted, and prior to the
issuance of the proposed regulations, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility adopted Formal Opinion 85-352, which
became the standard for tax return advice for the next twenty years.96 In that
opinion, the ABA abandoned the reasonable basis standard of Opinion 314 in
an attempt to ―elevate the minimum ethical standard above that which
‗reasonable basis‘ had come to represent for many practitioners and others.‖ 97
The committee noted that the reasonable basis standard had been subjected to
criticism by the tax bar, the IRS, and members of Congress, and as a result,
the reasonable basis standard had been eroded as an ethical guideline. 98
Under Formal Opinion 85-352,

92. Id. at 29,114.
93. Id. at 29,113.
94. Id.
95. Id. The proposed regulations would also have prohibited a practitioner from recommending
or advising a client that a position be taken if the taxpayer would have been liable for the substantial
understatement penalties. Id. at 29,114.
96. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‘l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985). Like all
formal opinions issued by the ABA, Formal Opinion 85-352 was adopted by the ABA Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, and not the Tax Section of the ABA. Id. A
contemporary commentator suggested Formal Opinion 85-352 was actually adopted in the face of a
proposal developed by the ABA Tax Section‘s Committee on Standards of Tax Practice and
approved by the ABA Tax Section‘s membership in May 1984, which would have raised the
standard to require taxpayers to take a ―meritorious position.‖ See Falk, supra note 18, at 643–44.
The Tax Section‘s comments on a draft of Formal Opinion 85-352 complained that the new language
would fail to elevate the minimum standard and that the proposed standard that a position be
―meritorious‖ would have been more stringent. Id. at 644 n.8.
97. Report of the Special Task Force on Formal Opinion 85-352, 39 TAX LAW. 635, 636
(1986) [hereinafter Report].
98. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‘l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985).
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a lawyer, in representing a client in the course of the
preparation of the client‘s tax return, may advise the
statement of positions most favorable to the client if the
lawyer has a good faith belief that those positions are
warranted in existing law or can be supported by a good faith
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law. A lawyer can have a good faith belief in this
context even if the lawyer believes the client‘s position
probably will not prevail. However, good faith requires that
there be some realistic possibility of success if the matter is
litigated. 99
The ABA therefore traded in the reasonable basis standard for the ―realistic
possibility of success‖ standard.100 In the ABA‘s view, the new realistic
possibility of success was ―an objective standard which can be enforced.‖ 101
In addition, the opinion stated that if the position met the realistic possibility
standard, the lawyer had no duty to require a client to attach riders to the
return.102
While realistic possibility may have been an improvement over reasonable
basis,103 Opinion 85-352 still suffered from the same flaws as its predecessor
opinion. Like Opinion 314, which viewed a tax return as a submission in an
adversarial proceeding and the lawyer‘s ethical obligations as essentially
those of an advocate, 104 Opinion 85-352 continued, and in some ways
heightened, that view. 105 Opinion 85-352 notes, quite accurately, that an
attorney must anticipate that a tax filing may result in an adversarial
relationship between the client and the IRS.106 However, Opinion 85-352
99. Id. (footnote omitted). Formal Opinion 85-352 did not quantify realistic possibility of
success. However, a special task force consisting of tax luminaries later quantified this standard as
something approaching one-third. WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at 63–64.
100. Report, supra note 97, at 635.
101. Id. at 637.
102. Id. Recognizing that, despite the advice from an attorney, clients might neverth eless be
subject to penalties, the opinion suggested that ―[i]n the role of advisor, the lawyer should counsel
the client as to whether the position is likely to be sustained by a court if cha llenged by the IRS, as
well as of the potential penalty consequences to the client if the position is taken on the tax return
without disclosure.‖ Id.
103. It can be argued that it is practically impossible to differentiate between a ten percent and
a one-third chance of success. See WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at 64.
104. Falk, supra note 18, at 646.
105. Id. at 647. The proposed revisions to Opinion 314 explicitly rejected that assumption. Id.
The proposed revisions maintained that an adversarial proceeding began with an audit. Id.
106. However, the low audit rates call into question what the risk actually is. As Falk notes,
because the government is not a ―fairly equipped opponent,‖ given that less than one percent of
returns will be audited, a tax return is not governed by the usual rules of adversarial proceedings. ―In
this view the Service is a paper tiger, not a leviathan the taxpayer should defeat by cunning.‖ Id. at
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takes this notion a step further and asserts that when a taxpayer takes an
aggressive position, it is more likely to result in an adversarial relationship. 107
Thus, the reasoning of Opinion 85-352 appeared to take the perverse position
that the more aggressive the position, the more an attorney may treat his or
her role as that of a zealous advocate.108 Opinion 85-352 also failed to take
into account the distinction the Model Rules make between lawyer as
advocate109 and lawyer as advisor.110 While the filing of a return may indeed
be the precursor to most tax controversies, the disclosure and self-assessment
purposes of tax returns are essentially nonadversarial.111 Our voluntary tax
system necessarily depends upon fair dealing with the government.112 Paying
taxes is not a dispute with the government; it is an obligation of citizenship. 113
―Failure to obey the law can result in an adversarial proceeding, but obeying
the law is something one does for the government, not against it.‖114
Despite its shortcomings, the realistic possibility of success standard was
adopted by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.115 The
ABA and the AICPA also encouraged Congress to adopt this standard for the
return preparer penalty of § 6694 so that a return preparer would not be liable
for the penalty if the position on the return had a realistic possibility of
success.116 In order to preserve some sense of harmony between the Code and
Circular 230, the Treasury withdrew its ―substantial authority‖ proposed
regulations in Circular 230 and adopted new § 10.34 in Circular 230, which
was designed to mirror the realistic possibility standards adopted by the ABA,
AICPA, and the preparer penalty provisions of § 6694. Under § 10.34, a
practitioner may not advise a client to take a position on a return unless the
practitioner determines that there is a realistic possibility of the position being
sustained on its merits, or the position is not frivolous, and the practitioner
advises the client to adequately disclose the position. 117

647–48.
107. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‘l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985).
108. Id.
109. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2002).
110. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2002).
111. Falk, supra note 18, at 648.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. AICPA Statements on Responsibilities in Tax Practice No. 1 (1988). The AICPA did not,
however, quantify the standard as a one-third, or any other, chance of success.
116. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 1396 (1989) (―The committee has adopted this new
standard because it generally reflects the professional conduct standards applicable to lawyers and to
certified public accountants.‖).
117. 31 C.F.R. § 10.34 (1994).
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―A position is considered to have a realistic possibility of
being sustained on its merits if a reasonable and wellinformed analysis by a person knowledgeable in the tax law
would lead such a person to conclude that the position has
approximately a one in three, or greater, likelihood of being
sustained on its merits.‖118
The realistic possibility standard was adopted in final regulations in 1994.119
Accordingly, for non-tax shelter opinions, realistic possibility of success
became the universal standard for tax advice.
D. The Rise of Mega Tax Shelters
The realistic possibility of success standard was designed to take into
account the ambiguous nature of the tax laws and to provide an objective
standard to which lawyers could adhere. 120 However, the lax one-in-three
threshold attendant upon that standard also encouraged the aggressive, protaxpayer side of tax lawyers. Lawyers did not need that encouragement. As
Randolph Paul noted more than half a century ago, ―The ethical problems
presented to tax advisers are of a more subtle character. Borderline questions
are presented which usually have enough potential argument in their favor to
furnish some basis for rationalization leading to a decision to act in the
apparent immediate financial interest of the taxpayer.‖121 Thus, there has
always been both an ethical and financial incentive to favor the client‘s
position.122
In the 1990s, changes in the legal and accounting marketplace magnified
this issue. Firms became more entrepreneurial, and ―consulting‖ became one
of the largest parts of large accounting firm practices. 123 Prior to its demise as
the result of action taken on behalf of Enron, Arthur Andersen was said to
have received up to $100 million in fees per year from Enron. 124 With larger
fees, some in the millions of dollars, the temptation to use vague and
aggressive tax advice standards became too great. 125 The combination of new
118. 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(4)(i) (1994).
119. T.D. 8545, 59 Fed. Reg. 31,523, 1994-2 C.B. 415 (June 20, 1994).
120. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‘l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985).
121. Paul, supra note 34, at 413; see also George Cooper, The Avoidance Dynamic: A Tale of
Tax Planning, Tax Ethics, and Tax Reform, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1553, 1555 (1980).
122. See Paul, supra note 34, at 413.
123. This change in the industry has occurred both in the United States and internationally. See
Daniel Muzio, The Professional Project and the Contemporary Re-Organisation of the Legal
Profession in England and Wales, 11 INT‘L J. LEGAL PROF. 33, 34 (2004).
124. John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the
1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 281 n.43 (2004).
125. Id. at 282.
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vehicles in corporate finance and the desire of public accounting firms, banks,
and law firms to generate significant revenues based on contingency or
premium fees, instead of traditional billable hours, led to new mega
shelters.126 The hallmark of the new tax shelters was to develop a scheme,
usually involving numerous transactions, which involved exploiting obscure
imperfections in the tax law to produce results that ―would not have been
intended if they had been foreseen, and which are likely to be corrected soon
after they are discovered.‖127 These schemes often involved sophisticated
financial products, special-use entities, and offshore banks not subject to U.S.
taxation.128
Some have argued that the current spate of tax shelters, while troubling, is
not necessarily new. 129 Professor James S. Eustice, for one, has dubbed
current shelters as merely ―old brine in new bottles.‖130 Nor is the view that
some lawyers and accountants are not acting appropriately new. Statements
from eminent tax lawyers and scholars at the Tax Law Review‘s 1952 banquet
lamented the conduct of tax lawyers of the day. 131 Professor Edmond Cahn
stated that lawyers ―may be fast losing our status as a profession and
becoming nothing more than skilled merchant-clerks.‖132
While tax shelters are indeed nothing new, and the estimated current
revenue loss is not appreciably greater than in past generations of shelters, 133
126. See Korb, supra note 45, at 420.
127. Id. at 421.
128. See, e.g., ACM P‘ship. v. Comm‘r, 157 F.3d 231, 234 (3d Cir. 1998).
129. For example, Senator Paul Douglas made the following notable statement regarding tax
loopholes (or ―truck holes‖ as he referred to them) on the Senate floor on May 26, 1961: ―These
gentlemen [lawyers and accountants] help citizens to avoid and, in some cases, to evade the payment
of taxes which in all good conscience they should pay. A bewildering variety of tax ‗gimmicks‘ and
arguments are developed with which the revenue officials and the courts are either unable or
unwilling to cope.‖ 107 CONG. REC. 9115 (1961) (statement of Sen. Douglas).
130. See James S. Eustice, Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters: Old “Brine” In New Bottles, 55
TAX L. REV. 135, 172 (2002) (―Granting that there is a problem here—and a serious one at that—it is
not a new one. Corporate ‗tax management‘ has been going on as long as the corporate tax rate
exceeded zero. While packaged in new and exotic wrappers, it is still the same old, same old thing.‖
(footnote omitted)).
131. See, e.g., Edmond Cahn, Opening Remarks to Ethical Problems of Tax Practitioners,
Address at the Tax Law Review‘s 1952 Banquet, in 8 TAX L. REV. 1, 1 (1952).
132. Id. It may be argued that lawyers have never been free from the charge that they (we) will
make any argument if the price is right. See, e.g., JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, THE MEDIEVAL ORIGINS
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 478–83 (2008) (quoting commentators of the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries, who opined, ―No one ever became an advocate, save to deliver himself from poverty‖;
―Clerks go to Bologna to learn law and duplicity, and consequently they get rich and lose their
souls‖; and ―[D]espite lawyers‘ professed devotion to justice, in reality they would take any case, no
matter how flimsy, and do or say anything for any client, no matter how wicked, provided that the
client paid their fees.‖).
133. IRS estimates it lost $3.6 billion in 1983. See Randall Smith & Kenneth H. Bacon, Boom
in Tax Shelters Artificially Lifts Prices of Much Real Estate, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 1983, at 1. In
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these Generation X shelters are nevertheless different. The current shelters
are invested in by high net-worth individuals and corporations,134 and the
magnitude of the losses claimed by each investor in these shelters dwarfs the
deductions claimed by shelter investors in the 1970s.135 For example, the
taxpayer in ACM Partnership claimed a capital loss of $84,997,111 resulting
from its London Interbank Offering Rate (LIBOR) notes transaction. 136 By
contrast, the shelters of the 1970s were invested in by thousands of
individuals, including middle-class taxpayers, thereby giving those shelters an
oddly democratic feel about them. 137 This demographic change has, I believe,
exacerbated the ―disrespect for the tax system‖ that so concerns Congress. 138
Other issues outside of the shelter industry, from the $350 billion ―tax gap‖ to
the need for reform or repeal of the Alternative Minimum Tax, have put a
premium on tax enforcement and have spurred the desire to ―do something‖
about the tax shelter issue.
It can also be argued that the type of advisors involved in shelters has
changed over the years. In the past, the shelter industry was populated by
professionals at the periphery of the profession. 139 The advisors involved in
the current shelters worked for some of the most prestigious accounting and
law firms. Thus, while lawyers during the early part of the twentieth century
were the celebrities of the day, garnering both wealth and fame, 140 tax lawyers
and other tax professionals in the first part of the twenty-first century have
achieved a different sort of notoriety. Arthur Andersen, the largest and oldest
international accounting firm, was indicted and, as a result, went out of

2007 dollars, that amount is $7.6 billion. The IRS estimates $10 billion in losses from tax shelters
currently. Mary Williams Walsh, Treasury Department Cracks Down on Tax Shelters for Firms,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2000, at C-1. Thus, the amount of money lost, while troubling, is not
appreciably higher than in past eras.
134. While they have commonly been called corporate tax shelters, many of these shelters were
also marketed to high net-worth individuals. See Korb, supra note 45, at 420 n.1.
135. See, e.g., Glass v. Comm‘r, 87 T.C. 1087 (1986) (a consolidated case with 1400
petitioners).
136. ACM P‘ship v. Comm‘r, 157 F.3d 232, 243 (3d Cir. 1998).
137. Korb, supra note 45, at 414.
138. See generally PROPOSALS RELATING TO TAX SHELTERS, supra note 13.
139. See, e.g., Goldberg v. United States, 789 F.2d 1341, 1342–43 (9th Cir. 1986) (describing
―Margolis transactions‖ typical of shelters peddled by Harry Margolis, which were ―characterized by
convoluted transfers of overvalued property rights, circular money movements among foreign trusts,
delayed drafting, signing and backdating of documents, and client oblivion to the financial realities
of their investments‖); J.P. Wenchel, Discussion of the Papers for Ethical Problems of Tax
Practitioners, Address at the Tax Law Review‘s 1952 Banquet, in 8 TAX L. REV. 1, 24 (1952) (―It is
the blackleg—and he was always in the profession. What are you going to do about him? He is on
the fringe of society.‖).
140. See, e.g., JOHN CAMPBELL, F.E. SMITH, FIRST EARL OF BIRKENHEAD 112, 113–14
(Pimlico 1983).
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business due to its involvement in the tax activities of Enron. 141 The
international accounting firm of KPMG escaped indictment only by agreeing
to a deferred prosecution agreement and a $450-million fine.142 Lawyers and
accountants have been indicted and pleaded guilty.143 With the involvement
and indictment of leaders of the profession in the tax shelter industry, the
problem is at least perceived to be larger and one requiring more attention. 144
Others blame changes in the method of statutory interpretation for the
increase in shelter activity. Professors Noel B. Cunningham and James R.
Repetti argue that the recent proliferation of tax shelters has, at least in part,
been caused by the ascendancy of textualism or hyper-textualism. 145 They
assert that tax advisors have become more aggressive in structuring
transactions that comply with the literal terms of a statute ―even though the
transactions may be highly questionable in light of the legislation‘s history or
underlying purpose. The result has been a cottage industry where investment
banks and accounting firms market tax shelters that triumph in form, but not
substance, at the expense of the fisc.‖ 146
Regardless of whether the current shelters are indeed anything new, or just
―old brine in new bottles,‖147 the response of the government is no doubt
different. Both Congress and the Treasury have acted to curtail tax shelters in
new and sometimes troubling ways. The following part will discuss several
of the government‘s actions.
III. RECENT GOVERNMENT ACTIONS
The government has, over the years, tried different tacks for attacking
shelters. In recent years, both Congress and the Treasury have tried to define
what a shelter is. As discussed more fully below, this effort has proven
unsuccessful. As a result, Congress has essentially thrown up its hands,
ceding more authority to the Treasury to decide what an abusive shelter is, to
gather information on taxpayer positions, and to impose penalties. As I argue
141. See Coffee, supra note 124, at 281.
142. Dick Thornburgh, The Dangers of Over-Criminalization and the Need for Real Reform:
The Dilemma of Artificial Entities and Artificial Crimes, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1279, 1283 (2007).
143. See, e.g., id.; Gregory L. Diskant, Rethinking Corporate Criminal Liability, LITIG., Winter
2008, at 5, 5.
144. For purposes of government regulation, perception is reality. If Congress and the
Treasury believe (as they appear to) that the newest crop of shelters is significantly worse than
previous iterations, they will take action. Moreover, Congress did in fact attack the previous shelters
with enactments in 1982 and 1986. See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982); Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085
(1986).
145. Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 1, at 2.
146. Id. (footnote omitted).
147. See Eustice, supra note 130.
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below, none of these efforts will solve the tax shelter problem, and the result
will, unfortunately, be fewer taxpayers getting good, solid tax advice. In this
part, I will discuss the covered opinion rules and the amendments to the return
advice standard in both § 6694 of Title 26 of the United States Code and §
10.34 of Circular 230. I focus on these new provisions because they are
emblematic of the government‘s anti-shelter efforts and provide a framework
for analyzing what the government can and should do.
A. The Covered Opinion Rules
The first of the government‘s most recent actions was an effort to attack
tax shelters by requiring lawyers and accountants to issue extensive, longform opinion letters in all shelter-like transactions, known as ―covered
opinions.‖ The covered opinion rules were based on the accurate premise that
tax shelter opinions were essentially incomplete and misleading. Many tax
shelter opinions simply ignored key facts or the implications of those facts or
ignored issues entirely. The covered opinion rules sought to rectify these
problems by requiring tax professionals to fully address all of the facts and
legal issues in a tax shelter opinion. However, the Treasury would only
require these exhaustive opinions in the case of a tax shelter, which
necessarily required the Treasury to first define a tax shelter. Unfortunately,
the definitions used in the covered opinion rules were so broad and
unworkable that these rules appeared to cover all tax advice and negatively
impacted legitimate tax advice.
1. Defining Tax Shelters
Coherently defining what constitutes a tax shelter has proven difficult for
Congress, the IRS, the courts, and academics. Arguably the most accurate
definition comes from Professor Michael Graetz, who defined a tax shelter as
―[a] deal done by very smart people that, absent tax considerations, would be
very stupid.‖148 While eloquent and perfectly descriptive, this definition is not
terribly helpful in deciding when tax planning has crossed the line into
abusive tax avoidance. The term ―tax shelter‖ itself is defined in the Internal
Revenue Code only in § 6662(d) and is defined as a partnership or other
entity, or any investment plan or arrangement, ―if a significant purpose of
such partnership, entity, plan, or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of
Federal income tax.‖149 While perhaps more helpful than Professor Graetz‘s

148. Tom Herman, A Special Summary and Forecast of Federal and State Tax Developments,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 1999, at A1 (quoting Professor Michael Graetz).
149. 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). Opinions on tax shelters have
always been treated differently from other tax issues. Unlike non-tax shelter opinions, which only
require a ―realistic possibility of success on the merits‖ (a one-in-three chance) or ―substantial
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definition, it is still not very illuminating. Indeed, it could be argued that a
―significant purpose‖ of anything a tax lawyer advises a client to do has at
least as a significant purpose the avoidance of tax.150 Professor Eustice and
other scholars have summarized the indicia of an abusive tax shelter
transaction. 151 However, these indicia are more descriptive than definitional,
and they do not purport to be a general guide to demarcating the border
between planning and abuse. 152 ABA Formal Opinion 346 defined a tax
shelter as
an investment which has as a significant feature either . . . or
both of the following attributes: (1) deductions in excess of
income from the investment being available in any year to
reduce income from other sources in that year, and (2) credits
in excess of the tax attributable to the income from the
investment being available in any year to offset taxes on
income from other sources in that year.153
This too appeared to be a rather targeted definition of tax shelters and not a
general shelter definition. 154
2. Covered Opinions
With this history in mind, the Treasury took its shot at defining (and
deterring) abusive shelters when it amended Circular 230 and adopted the
covered opinion rules.155 Under the rules that became effective in June
2005,156 if a tax practitioner provides written advice on certain types of

authority‖ (somewhere between one in three and fifty percent), tax shelter opinions require the
practitioner to determine that the issue is ―more likely than not‖ to succeed on the merits if
challenged. The more likely than not standard is defined as greater than a fifty percent chance of
success. See supra Part II.
150. Schler, supra note 1, at 329.
151. See, e.g., Eustice, supra note 130, at 158–59; see also Korb, supra note 45, at 421. In Part
III.D infra, I will discuss other proposals by scholars to resolve the current tax shelter problem.
152. Nevertheless, Congress and the Treasury have used some of these indicia in defining what
is a ―reportable transaction,‖ which would require taxpayers to disclose investments in transactions
that possess these indicia. See 26 U.S.C. § 6111 (2000 & Supp. V 2005). Again, what constitutes a
―reportable transaction‖ was never intended to provide a global definition of what constitutes a tax
shelter.
153. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‘l Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 n.1 (1982).
154. See Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., ABA Formal Opinion 346 and a New Statutory Penalty Regime,
111 TAX NOTES 1269, 1270 (2006).
155. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35 (2005).
156. The final regulations effective May 19, 2005, came after several sets of proposed
regulations and amendments. See 70 Fed. Reg. 28,824 (May 19, 2005); 69 Fed. Reg. 75,839 (Dec.
20, 2004).
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investments,157 defined as a ―covered opinion,‖ the advice must be given in
the form of a ―covered opinion‖ consistent with the rules of § 10.35.158 Thus,
both the type of investment and the type of opinion letter required were
referred to as covered opinions.159 As set forth below, the type of investment
that constitutes a covered opinion (read tax shelter) is far from clear under the
regulations. Moreover, the requirements that must be followed in drafting a
covered opinion are detailed, time-consuming, and expensive for clients. 160
However, if the written communication does concern a covered opinion and
the practitioner does not satisfy all of the covered opinion requirements of
§ 10.35, the practitioner can face disciplinary action by the Treasury.161 As a
result, practitioners were loathe to provide any advice and defaulted to a
strategy of ―legending out‖ of the covered opinion rules by attaching
disclaimers denying penalty protection for their clients.162
Under the regulations, a ―covered opinion‖ is any written communication,
including emails, letters, and memoranda, that give advice on any tax issue as
long as the opinion concerns one of three types of investment. 163 The first
type of investment is so-called listed transactions. 164 Listed transactions are
investments or schemes that the Treasury has specifically listed in public
announcements as being abusive tax shelters.165 If the investment is, or is
substantially similar to a listed transaction, a covered opinion must be
issued.166
The second type of investment is one that has as its ―principal purpose‖
the avoidance or evasion of any tax (not just income taxes) imposed by the
Internal Revenue Code. 167 For purposes of the covered opinion rules, the
principal purpose of an investment is the avoidance or evasion of any tax
imposed by the Internal Revenue Code ―if that purpose exceeds any other

157. The covered opinion rules echo the language of § 6662(d) and use the phrase ―a
partnership or other entity, any investment plan or arrangement, or other plan or arrangement.‖ 31
C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(10). Throughout this discussion, I will use the word ―investment‖ to cover this
more latitudinous definition. See 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
158. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c) (2005).
159. This redundant use of the term ―covered opinion‖ contributed to the confusion
surrounding the requirements of § 10.35.
160. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.31(d) (2005).
161. 31 C.F.R. § 10.60 (2005).
162. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(4)(ii) (2005).
163. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2) (2005).
164. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(A) (2005).
165. Listed transactions are a subset of reportable transactions under 26 U.S.C. § 6111 (2000 &
Supp. V 2006); 26 U.S.C.A. § 6707A (West 2007); 26 C.F.R. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) (2008).
166. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.6011-4(b)(2).
167. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(B) (2005).
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purpose.‖168 Commentators were concerned about the broad definition of
―principal purpose‖169 and the difficulty a practitioner would have in
determining whether a client‘s purpose in investing in an entity involved
primarily tax avoidance or some other purpose. In addition, many
practitioners rightly expressed concern that some investments have as their
principal purpose the avoidance of federal tax and are yet perfectly acceptable
under the Code. For example, family limited partnerships, where one of the
main reasons for such investment plans is the avoidance of federal estate tax,
could be a covered opinion.170 Likewise an S corporation, arguably the sole
purpose of which is to avoid corporate level tax and/or self-employment taxes,
would also be a covered opinion.171 Commentators wondered whether every
piece of written advice recommending the use of an S corporation must be
made via a long-form covered opinion.172
When the final regulations were adopted, the ―principal purpose‖
definition was limited to provide that the principal purpose of an investment is
not to avoid or evade federal tax if that investment ―has as its purpose the
claiming of tax benefits in a manner consistent with the statute and
Congressional purpose.‖173 This language resolved the thorny issue raised by
the commentators and, by doing so, the Treasury acknowledged that some tax
planning, and indeed some ―tax shelters,‖ are acceptable under current law. 174
The third type of investment is one in which a ―significant purpose‖ is the
avoidance or evasion of any federal tax.175 Standing alone, this definition
would cover any advice given by a tax practitioner. This broad definition is
limited by the qualifiers that the written advice be either (1) a ―reliance
opinion,‖176 (2) a ―marketed opinion,‖177 (3) ―subject to conditions of
confidentiality,‖178 or (4) subject to ―contractual protection.‖179 Because
168. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(10) (2005).
169. Id.; see T.D. 9201, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,824, 28,825 (May 19, 2005).
170. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(10).
171. Id.
172. See T.D. 9201, 70 Fed. Reg. at 28,825.
173. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(10).
174. I will return to the limiting language, ―consistent with the statute and Congressional
purpose,‖ in the discussion of a workable standard for tax advice.
175. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(C) (2005).
176. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(C)(1) (2005) (emphasis omitted).
177. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(C)(2) (2005) (emphasis omitted) (an opinion that is used by
promoters to market a particular investment plan, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(5)(i) (2005)).
178. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(C)(3) (2005) (emphasis omitted) (the taxpayer can only learn of
the investment if he or she promises not to disclose the terms of the plan, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(6)
(2005)).
179. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(C)(4) (2005) (emphasis omitted) (the taxpayer may obtain a
refund of fees paid to the professional should the IRS challenge the plan and the taxpayer has to
repay the tax benefits, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(7) (2005)).
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typical tax advice does not involve marketed opinions or opinions subject to
contractual protection or confidentiality requirements,180 the most important
qualifier concerns reliance opinions.
Unlike the other covered opinion definitions, in which the definitions are
based on the kind of investment the taxpayer is seeking advice on, a reliance
opinion is determined by the level of certainty reached in the opinion. 181 A
reliance opinion is any written advice ―if the advice concludes at a confidence
level of at least more likely than not (a greater than 50 percent likelihood) that
one or more significant Federal tax issues would be resolved in the taxpayer‘s
favor.‖182 Conversely, a written communication or email will not be treated as
a reliance opinion ―if the practitioner prominently discloses in the written
advice that it was not intended or written by the practitioner to be used, and
that it cannot be used by the taxpayer, for the purpose of avoiding penalties
that may be imposed on the taxpayer.‖183 This dichotomy left many
practitioners with the impression that all tax advice, including emails, was
required either to be in the form of a covered opinion or contain a no-reliance
disclaimer.184 This impression was reinforced by an unrelated section of the
covered opinion rules requiring that if an opinion does not reach a conclusion
at a confidence level of at least more likely than not, the opinion must contain
the no-reliance disclaimer.185
However, a close reading of the reliance opinion rule shows that written
advice will be a reliance opinion (and therefore a covered opinion) only if the
practitioner reaches a more likely than not opinion. 186 If a practitioner reaches
a conclusion at a confidence level less than more likely than not, it is not a
covered opinion.187 Nothing prevented a practitioner from giving a favorable
opinion at less than the more likely than not opinion standard, and clients
could rely on that advice and obtain protection from penalties in most cases. 188
180. Many ―modern‖ tax shelters had as one of their characteristics that they were marketed to
many potential ―investors,‖ that they offered protection to the investor in the form of contractual
protection, or that they would only be disclosed to potential investors on the condition that the
investor/target agreed not to disclose the details of the investment. See, e.g., Korb, supra note 45, at
421. Given that these types of investments or plans were more typical of tax shelters, making advice
regarding these investments more difficult does not impede legitimate tax advice.
181. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(4)(i) (2005).
182. Id.
183. 31 C.F.R. 10.35(b)(4)(ii) (2005).
184. And a number of articles have contributed to this misunderstanding. See, e.g., Dan W.
Holbrook, Where There’s a Will: Revenge of the IRS: Circular 230 Changes Law Practice, 41 TENN.
B.J. 28, 30 (2005); Scott E. Vincent, New IRS Tax Shelter Rules May Require Disclosures for
Broadly Defined “Tax Advice,” 61 J. MO. B. 213, 213 (2005).
185. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(e)(4) (2005).
186. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(4) (2005).
187. Id.
188. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 6664 (West 2007); Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4 (2008). But see 26 U.S.C.
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Moreover, while the seemingly categorical statement of subsection (e)(4) that
all opinions that do not reach a more likely than not conclusion must include a
no-penalty disclaimer, a closer reading of this provision shows this is not the
case.189 Clause (4) is part of subsection (e), which begins: ―A covered opinion
must contain all of the following disclosures that apply.‖ 190 Since an opinion
given at less than a more likely than not level is not a covered opinion, a noreliance disclaimer is not required. 191
Despite the limited coverage of the reliance opinions, given the ambiguity
of the regulations and the possibility of sanctions for failure to follow the
covered opinion rules, practitioners determined that discretion—and
disclaimers—were the better part of valor. It has therefore become standard
practice for most firms that give tax advice to include in every email or
written product, even routine, non-tax related communications with clients or
other lawyers, language to the effect that ―this communication may not be
relied upon for penalty protection.‖ The ubiquitous nature of the penaltyprotection disclaimer soon lowered the disclaimers to a farcical level, with
one internet vendor marketing coffee mugs, t-shirts, and even underwear
emblazoned with the no-penalty-protection mantra.192
The result of the covered opinion rules was that practitioners became more
careful and parsimonious with their tax advice. While the covered opinion
rules can be parsed with some effort, the breadth and coverage of these rules
are still far from clear in many cases. Moreover, the provisions are
unacceptably complex with numerous defined terms and overlapping
standards and definitions. 193 The standard for giving tax advice simply cannot
consist of numerous pages of dense text—such a standard is completely
unworkable. 194 Tax lawyers and accountants cannot be spending more time
trying to figure out what the tax advice standard means than applying it to
provide tax advice. The truly bad actors who do not care about real tax advice
will still peddle abusive transactions, and there is little to be gained by an
unadvised taxpayer community. 195 As Mark Johnson argued:
6694(a)(1) (2000) (authorizing penalties for understatements due to unreasonable positions). In
addition, as is discussed in the next part, providing an opinion below the more likely than not
standard may now require disclosure of the position on the return.
189. See 31 C.F.R. § 1035(e)(4).
190. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(e) (2005) (emphasis added).
191. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(C) (2005); 31 C.F.R. 10.35(b)(4) (2005).
192. Café Press, http://shop.cafepress.com/no-penalty (last visited Nov. 13, 2008).
193. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.35.
194. In addition to being bad policy, the covered opinion rules may also be unconstitutional.
See David T. Moldenhauer, Circular 230 Opinion Standards, Legal Ethics and First Amendment
Limitations on the Regulation of Professional Speech By Lawyers, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 843, 844
(2006).
195. See Freedman, supra note 43, at 346 n.68.
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If he [the average taxpayer] can receive expert advice which
he trusts, he will follow that advice. If he does not, he will
use a do-it-yourself kit of his own. It is this latter prospect at
which we should all shudder—not as tax experts who will be
done out of fees, but as citizens facing the breakdown of our
voluntary compliance system. It is vital for us to distinguish
between tax avoidance under a system of respectable expert
advice, and the wholesale tax evasion which would be
accomplished by a skeptical and unadvised citizenry. Right
now, all the highly publicized tax avoidance gadgets amount
to a narrow strip of gray between the accepted blacks and
whites of the law. That small blemish on the purity of our tax
structure is indeed a slight price to pay for keeping the black
and the white as separate as they are; the alternative could be
one large smudge of dirty gray.196
B. Revised Opinion Standards: More Likely Than Not
The other major course of action, presumably undertaken to improve tax
advisors‘ ethics and deter tax shelters,197 was the amendment of the tax
preparer penalties. As discussed at length above, 198 the general standard
applicable to tax advice since the mid-1980s has been the realistic possibility
of success standard.199 That standard was enforced in part by § 6694, which
imposes penalties against tax return preparers who give tax advice that falls

―It is important not to make life more difficult for the compliant, but to
concentrate regulatory resources on the non-compliant. If the uncertainty at the
borderline affects those who wish to comply it will be unacceptable but if it
simply makes it difficult for those who wish to manipulate the rules then it may
be acceptable.‖
Id.
196. Johnson, supra note 37, at 30; see also Thomas J. Graves, Responsibility of the Tax
Adviser, 114 J. ACC‘Y NO. 6, 33, 35 (1962) (―Certainly a well-advised taxpayer is more likely to
observe good standards than one who is ill-advised and, being uninformed, feels himself free to take
refuge in his own subjective views of what the law might be.‖).
197. I use the word ―presumably‖ because there is no indication in the legislative history as to
why Congress enacted the revisions to 26 U.S.C. § 6694. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION,
110TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE ―SMALL BUSINESS AND WORK OPPORTUNITY TAX
ACT OF 2007‖ AND PENSION RELATED PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN H.R. 2206, at 34 (Comm. Print
2007) [hereinafter TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 2206]. One can only presume that it was
undertaken to improve practitioner conduct. Whether it will have this beneficial effect remains to be
seen.
198. See supra Part II.
199. 31 C.F.R. § 10.34 (2007).
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below the realistic possibility standard.200 Indeed, it was after the adoption of
this standard in § 6694 that the Treasury embraced the realistic possibility
standard as the general standard for tax advice in § 10.34 of Circular 230.
Congress and the Treasury substantially altered that standard with the
amendment of § 6694 by the Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act
of 2007 and the Treasury‘s proposed changes to § 10.34 of Circular 230.201
Prior to its amendment in 2007, the penalty under § 6694(a) applied to any
income tax return preparer202 if (1) any part of an understatement of liability
was due to a position for which there was not a realistic possibility of being
sustained on its merits; (2) the return preparer knew or reasonably should have
known of such position; and (3) the position was not disclosed or was
frivolous.203 Thus, for purposes of § 6694, as long as the position met the
realistic possibility of success standard, the penalty was not applicable. 204
As amended, § 6694(a) broadened the application of the penalty from
―income tax return preparers‖ to ―[a]ny tax return preparer,‖ including
preparers of estate tax, gift tax, and employment tax returns.205 The
amendments also increased the amount of the penalty from a relatively
modest $250 per return to the greater of $1,000 or fifty percent of the income
derived or to be derived by the practitioner. 206 With fees for tax advice
routinely in the thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of dollars, this penalty
could be substantial indeed. 207 The revised penalty would apply if (1) the
preparer knew or should have known of the position; (2) the position did not
meet the more likely than not standard; and (3) the position was not disclosed
or there was no reasonable basis for the position. 208

200. 26 U.S.C. § 6694(a) (2000).
201. Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 190
(2007); Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 72 Fed. Reg. 54,621
(Sept. 26, 2007) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10).
202. 26 U.S.C.A. § 7701(a)(36) (West 2007) (defining income tax return preparer). Moreover,
the realistic possibility of success standard in Circular 230 was adopted by the Treasury in response
to the amendment of § 6694 in 1986 and that section‘s use of the realistic possibility of success
standard. Regulations Governing the Practice of Attorneys, Certified Public Accountants, Enrolled
Agents, and Enrolled Actuaries Before the Internal Revenue Service, 59 Fed. Reg. 31,523 (June 20,
1994).
203. 26 U.S.C. § 6694 (2000).
204. As discussed above, the Treasury‘s adoption of the realistic possibility standard as part of
Circular 230 in 1994 was in reaction to Congress‘s enactment of § 6694 and its realistic possibility
standard. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
205. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6694(a) (West 2007) (emphasis added).
206. Id.
207. Given the ambiguity of the more likely than not standard, these penalties threaten the
righteous as well as the evil (in fact, they are probably more of a threat to the righteous).
208. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6694(a)(2) (West 2007).
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This revision to the penalties applicable to return advice was not proposed
by the Treasury or the IRS. In fact, the Chief Counsel of the IRS admitted
that the Treasury was ―blindsided‖ by the amendments. 209 Moreover, the
amendments originated not in the Senate Finance Committee nor in the House
Ways and Means Committee, but rather in the House Rules Committee, and
there is little legislative history on this portion of the Act. 210 In part because
of this dubious lineage, the implications of these amendments were not fully
vetted, and the amendments created several implementation problems for the
Treasury.211
C. Problems Fitting In
The first change wrought by the § 6694 amendments, and one of the most
necessary, was the Treasury‘s proposed regulations amending the general
standard providing tax advice under Circular 230.212 As discussed above,
209. See generally Lee A. Sheppard, Government Officials Discuss Partnership, Shelter Issues,
TAX ANALYSTS, June 4, 2007.
210. The only legislative material on this portion of the Act is the Joint Committee‘s Technical
Explanation of the “Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007” and Pension Related
Provisions Contained in H.R. 2206. That report provides as follows:
The provision also alters the standards of conduct that must be met to
avoid imposition of the penalties for preparing a return with respect to which
there is an understatement of tax. First, the provision replaces the realistic
possibility standard for undisclosed positions with a requirement that there be a
reasonable belief that the tax treatment of the position was more likely than not
the proper treatment. The provision replaces the not-frivolous standard
accompanied by disclosure with the requirement that there be a reasonable basis
for the tax treatment of the position accompanied by disclosure.
TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 2206, supra note 197, at 34.
211. In addition to dealing with the implementation problems, the Treasury attempted to shape
the meaning of the amendments by putting its own spin on what § 6694 provides. A close reading of
the 2007 amendments to § 6694 shows that a return preparer will be liable for the penalty only if (1)
the preparer knew or reasonably should have known of the position; (2) the position did not meet the
more likely than not standard; and (3) the position was not disclosed or there was no reasonable basis
for the position. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6694(a). Thus, as drafted, as long as there was a reasonable basis for
the position, whether disclosed or not, the penalty should not apply. Id. The Treasury was clearly
troubled by the literal terms of the statute, since the penalty would not apply, regardless of disclosu re
or the position met the more likely than not standard. Id. Hence, the amendments would lower, not
raise, the standard applicable to tax advice. One IRS employee told me that, in his opinion, Congress
could have been ―a little clearer‖ in its wording of § 6694(a). In an effort to effect what it believes
the intent of Congress to be, the Treasury issued Notice 2007-54, in which the Treasury interprets
§ 6694 to read that the penalty will be applicable if the position was not disclosed and there was no
reasonable basis for the position. I.R.S. Notice 2007-54, 2007-27 I.R.B. 1, 12. This interpretation
appears to be contrary to the plain meaning of the statute.
212. 31 C.F.R. § 10.34 (2007). As discussed, supra note 201 and accompanying text, the
Treasury initially employed the realistic possibility of success standard in Circular 230 in response to
the inclusion of that standard in the § 6694 penalties in 1994. With the 2007 amendments to § 6694,
the Treasury now feels free to revise the Circular 230 standards.
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under § 10.34 of Circular 230, a practitioner could advise a client to take a
position on a return as long as the position had a realistic possibility of
success on the merits. Obviously, that standard had to be changed to resolve
the conflict between amended § 6694 and § 10.34. Under the revised version
of § 10.34, a practitioner may not advise a client to take a position on a tax
return, or prepare the portion of a tax return on which a position is taken,
unless (1) the practitioner has a reasonable belief that the position satisfies the
more likely than not standard; or (2) the position has a reasonable basis and is
adequately disclosed.213 The proposed amendments thus revise § 10.34 to
conform to amended § 6694 (or at least the Treasury‘s interpretation of §
6694), and more likely than not (i.e., a greater than fifty-percent chance of
success).
Unfortunately, the amendments to § 10.34 create their own downstream
problems as well. For example, the revision to § 10.34 may require the
Treasury to revisit the covered opinion rules—more specifically, the rules
applicable to reliance opinions. As discussed above, advice is a reliance
opinion—and therefore a covered opinion—only if the practitioner opines that
the position has a more likely than not chance of success. 214 With the
amendments to § 6694, a practitioner would face penalties of up to fifty
percent of the fees earned unless he or she issued a more likely than not
opinion or the position was disclosed.215 As a result, unless the covered
opinion rules are modified, it appears that all written tax advice will either
have to be in the form of a covered opinion or contain the no-reliance
disclaimer, or the position with respect to that advice will have to be disclosed
on the return. This makes the reliance opinion standard nearly superfluous.
Second, the Treasury has issued interim guidance and proposed
regulations designed to deal with what it has termed ―the complexities and
anomalies‖ resulting from the inconsistent treatment of return preparers under
the § 6694 amendments and of taxpayers under the accuracy-related penalty
provisions applicable to taxpayers, as well as the inconsistencies between the
§ 6694 amendments and Circular 230.216 For example, the 2007 amendments
to § 6694 provide, in essence, that a practitioner may not advise a taxpayer to
take a position on a return unless the position has a more likely than not
chance of success or the position is disclosed to the IRS. However, under §
213. 72 Fed. Reg. 54,621, 54,622 (Sept. 26, 2007).
214. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(4) (2007).
215. Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 203
(2007).
216. See I.R.S. Notice 2008-13, 2008-3 I.R.B. 282. In addition to Notice 2008-13, the Treasury
has issued Notice 2007-54, Notice 2008-11, and Notice 2008-14, and on June 17, 2008, issued
proposed regulations under § 6694 and § 7701. Tax Return Preparer Penalties Under Sections 6694
and 6695, 73 Fed. Reg. 34,560 (June 17, 2008).
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6662(d), a taxpayer may take a position on a return without disclosure as long
as the position meets the lower standard of ―substantial authority.‖ 217 Thus, as
a result of the amendments to § 6694, tax practitioners were subject to a
higher standard than their clients. Given these divergent standards, what may
the practitioner advise his or her client? Should the practitioner advise:
―There is something called substantial authority but I cannot advise you take a
position that meets that standard.‖? The differing standards between advisor
and client, and the real possibility that the advisor could face substantial
penalties, thus created a conflict of interest between advisors and their clients.
The Treasury recognized this problem and essentially declined to enforce
certain provisions of amended § 6694. Under the proposed regulations,218 a
return preparer may advise a client to take a position on a return even though
the return preparer does not have a reasonable belief that the position would
more likely than not be sustained on the merits, as long as the position has a
reasonable basis and the position is ―disclosed‖ in one of the following ways:
(1) the position is actually disclosed on the return or on a properly completed
Form 8275; (2) the return preparer provides the client with the prepared tax
return that includes the disclosure statement; or (3) if the position meets the
substantial authority standard (and therefore the client is not required to
disclose the position), the return preparer ―advises the taxpayer of all the
penalty standards applicable to the taxpayer under section 6662.‖219 Thus,
while Congress mandated in its 2007 amendments to § 6694 that a position on
a return either meet the more likely than not standard or the position is
required to be disclosed on the return, 220 the Treasury will not impose the
penalty against tax professionals as long as they advise their clients on the
ways to comply with the substantial authority standard. Moreover, the
requirement of § 6694 that the position must be disclosed may be satisfied by
the return preparer ―disclosing‖ to the client (and not the IRS).221 The net
217. 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
218. Tax Return Preparer Penalties Under Sections 6694 and 6695, 73 Fed. Reg. at 34,562.
219. Id. at 34,565. The return preparer must also contemporaneously document the advice in
the tax return preparer‘s files. Id. at 34,566. In addition, return preparers may satisfy the disclosure
requirement in the case of a tax shelter or reportable transaction, as defined in 26 U.S.C. §
6662(d)(2)(C) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) or 26 U.S.C. § 6662A (Supp. IV 2004), if the return preparer
advises the taxpayer that there must be, at a minimum, substantial authority for the position, that the
taxpayer must possess a reasonable belief that the tax treatment was more likely than not the proper
treatment in order to avoid a penalty under § 6662(d) or § 6662A as applicable, and that disclosure
will not protect the taxpayer from assessment of an accuracy-related penalty if either § 6662(d)(2)(C)
or § 6662A applies to the position. Id.
220. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6694(a)(2)(C)(i) (West 2007) provides that the penalty will be imposed if
―the position was not disclosed as provided in § 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii),‖ which requires disclosure to the
IRS on the face of the return or on a statement or form attached to the return. 26 U.S.C. §
6662(d)(2)(B)(ii) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
221. Lee A. Sheppard, Diluting the Preparer Penalties by Regulation, 118 TAX NOTES 1213,
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effect of these rules is that, contrary to the explicit intent of revised § 6694,
the substantial authority standard appears to be the standard applicable to tax
professionals.222 Congress has apparently recognized the problems with its
amendments to § 6694 and, in the Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum
Tax Relief Act of 2008,223 modified the penalty standards yet again. Under
the most recent version of § 6694,224 a return preparer will not be liable for the
penalty if there is substantial authority for the position or the position has a
reasonable basis and is disclosed.225 Thus, the amendments appear to be
consistent with Treasury‘s position in the proposed regulations. 226
D. More Fundamental Issues
While averting a conflict between the standards of more likely than not
and substantial authority, the IRS Notices and proposed regulations
underscore, but do not resolve, the two largest problems with the amendments
to § 6694 and the proposed revisions of § 10.34: the shortcomings of the more
likely than not standard and the problems attendant to disclosure.
1. More Likely Than Not, Not to Work
While it is an improvement over the realistic possibility and reasonable
basis standards, the more likely than not standard suffers from the same
fundamental flaw as its predecessors. Basing opinion standards on a ―chance
of success‖ should a matter be litigated is in many, if not most, cases an
exceedingly difficult determination, particularly in cases where the law is new
or developing. More troubling, it takes the focus off what I believe the real
question tax advisors should be giving advice on—what does the law provide?
Making a prediction on a chance of success in tax law is fraught with
difficulties. First, by looking at the chance of success should the matter be
litigated, the focus is necessarily directed toward a hypothetical event, judicial
review, which often has yet to occur. 227 Yet, in making this determination, the
tax advisor may not take into account that the matter may not be subject to

1216–17 (2008).
222. See id. at 1216.
223. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008). The Tax Extenders and Alternative
Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008, along with the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
and the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008, was part of the massive financial bailout
bill quickly passed by Congress in October 2008.
224. The amendments generally apply to returns prepared after May 25, 2007. Id. § 506(b).
225. Id. § 506(a). The more likely than not standard continues to apply to tax shelters. Id.
226. Given that these amendments to § 6694 occurred during the final production of this
Article, a full analysis of these amendments is not possible.
227. See Sarah B. Lawsky, Probably? Understanding Tax Law’s Uncertainty, 157 U. PENN. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 19, on file with author).

2008]

“PURPOSIVE TEXTUALISM” AND TAX SHELTERS

67

audit.228 Given the low audit rates, the determination of success if the matter
is litigated is necessarily specious, which plays into the cost-benefit analysis
of, if not advisors, then certainly taxpayers.229 Moreover, as Professor Sarah
Lawsky points out, a percentage chance of success, whether it be one in three
or greater than fifty percent, cannot be determined based on the frequency
with which it has succeeded. 230 The standard is thus inherently disingenuous.
For example, if a circuit court in the taxpayer‘s jurisdiction has upheld a
position, then even if the numerous district court opinions in that circuit struck
it down, the position is ―correct‖ in that circuit. Thus, the more likely than not
calculation cannot be made based solely on the number of times a position has
succeeded or failed in litigation.
In calculating the frequency with which a position is upheld, an advisor
must also determine the cases with which the matter at issue should be
compared. This requires an advisor to determine whether the position in
question is ―like‖ another position, which can be troubling given that the
decisions on any tax issue tend to be highly fact-specific. Thus, knowing that
five out of ten ―similar‖ positions have been upheld does not tell us that there
is a fifty-percent chance that this particular position will be upheld, nor that if
the court looks at all ten of the positions on the taxpayer‘s return, it will find
that five of them are correct.231 Most of the case law on gray-area tax issues
provides at best only anecdotal evidence of how a court might rule and
provides no real basis for an advisor to determine a chance of success. The
old saw that ―the plural of anecdote is not data‖ is especially apt here.232 In
addition, the quality of the lawyering or whether the case was handled pro se
in the Tax Court could well have impacted the court‘s decision, or the court‘s
decision might be so fundamentally flawed as to be objectively ―wrong.‖ 233
Thus, the fact that a court ruled against the position at issue may well not be
the end of the inquiry. Furthermore, with many newly concocted tax shelters,
as well as legitimate but cutting-edge tax questions, neither the specific issue
nor any issue similar to it may ever have been ruled on by a court. Thus, there
would be no data, or even an anecdote, for an advisor to consider in
determining a chance of success from a predictive perspective.
The Treasury appears to be fully aware of the limitations of basing
opinion standards on the chance of success, especially in relatively new areas
of the law. The proposed regulations under § 6694 provide that a ―tax return
228. 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(d)(1) (2007).
229. Lawsky, supra note 227, at 13–14.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 16.
232. See, e.g., Edith Greene, A Love-Hate Relationship, 18 JUST. SYS. J. 99, 100 (1995) (book
review) (emphasis omitted).
233. See Rowen, supra note 82, at 243.
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preparer may reasonably believe that a position more likely than not would be
sustained on its merits despite the absence of other types of authority if the
position is supported by a well-reasoned construction of the applicable
statutory provision.‖234 The Treasury has thus acknowledged that there will
be cases in which an advisor cannot practicably determine whether a position
meets a certain chance of success based on a comparison of existing
authorities, but will instead base his or her opinion on an interpretation of the
statute. Professor Lawsky refers to this as a subjectivist interpretation of
probability. 235 Under this approach, the focus is not on the chance of success
from a numerical point of view, but on the advisor‘s degree of belief in the
position.236 Thus, while still focusing on a chance of success, the subjectivist
interpretation acknowledged in the Treasury‘s position in section 1.66942(b)(1) moves the inquiry away from what a court might decide based on a
historical inquiry and closer to a focus on the rules themselves and the
lawyer‘s opinion with respect to those rules. 237
This distinction was made by H.L.A. Hart, who provided a useful analogy
in demonstrating the pitfalls of the predictive theory of law, i.e., ―the
law . . . is what the courts say it is.‖238 Hart analogizes the law and judges‘
role in the law to a game of cricket or baseball played first without, and then
with, an official scorer.239 Prior to the use of the scorer, the players all agree
to the rules and more or less abide by those rules in resolving any disputes. 240
When an official scorer is inserted into the game, the scorer‘s decision is the
final word on the application of the rules. 241 Players can predict what the
234. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(1), 73 Fed. Reg. 34,560, 34,574 (June 17, 2008); see also
I.R.S. Notice 2008-13, supra note 216, at 286 ex. 10.
235. Lawsky, supra note 227, at 10–11.
236. Id.
237. It should be noted that the quoted portion of section 1.6694-2(b)(1) is only one sentence in
a thirty-page set of regulations. Other parts of the proposed regulations employ a decidedly
frequentist or numerical interpretation of probability. See, e.g., Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(4)
ex. 4, 73 Fed. Reg. 34,560, 34,574 (June 17, 2008). Thus, it cannot be said that the Treasury has
abandoned a numerical or frequentist approach to these questions.
238. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 141 (2d ed. 1994). Falk noted his criticism of the
realistic possibility of success standard when it was adopted in 1985:
Legal realism—at least in the crude predictive version espoused by
Holmes, Gray, Llewellyn, and Hughes—is the position that law is whatever a
judge says it is. As a general theory of law, this predictive version of legal
realism has been thoroughly discredited for over a generation. Yet Opinion 352
defines the term ―good faith‖ in terms of this crude legal realism—i.e., the
predicted result of adjudication.
Falk, supra note 18, at 653–54 (footnotes omitted).
239. HART, supra note 238, at 142.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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scorer will do in a given situation, but these are merely unofficial statements
as to what the scorer will officially decide. 242 The players can predict what
the scorer‘s ruling will be because they know and have used the rules, and
because the scorer will, in the vast majority of the cases, follow the rules. 243
While the scorer could in theory make any ruling he or she wished, if the rules
are disregarded too frequently, the game ceases to be cricket or baseball and
becomes the game of ―scorer‘s discretion.‖ 244 Applying this analogy to law,
judges have considerably more discretion than official scorers in a game, but
they nevertheless are bound by laws, constitutions, and rules. 245 Hart argues:
Such standards could not indeed continue to exist unless most
of the judges of the time adhered to them, for their existence
at any given time consists simply in the acceptance and use of
them as standards of correct adjudication. But this does not
make the judge who uses them the author of these
standards . . . .
....
. . . [P]redictions of what a court will do are like the
prediction we might make that chess-players will move the
bishop diagonally: they rest ultimately on an appreciation of
the non-predictive aspect of rules, and of the internal point of
view of the rules as standards accepted by those to whom the
predictions relate.246
In determining whether a position on a tax return meets the more likely
than not standard, advisors are asked to predict how a court will ultimately
rule. Thus, it is the rule, not what the judge determines it to be, that should be
controlling. As Theodore Falk noted in his criticism of ABA Formal Opinion
85-352: ―Whether one can in good faith believe in the lawfulness of a position
is not the same as predicting that the courts will adopt it. Rather, a position is
lawful if the courts ought to adopt it.‖247
Moreover, for purposes of taxpayers‘ reliance defense, it is the mere
saying of the phrase ―more likely than not‖ by the tax professional that makes
242. Id. at 143.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 142.
245. Id. at 145.
246. Id. at 145, 147.
247. Falk, supra note 18, at 655. According to Falk, the purpose of the standard should be to
―improve lawyers‘ arguments, not their footnotes.‖ Id. at 657.
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it so. If a lawyer or accountant advises a taxpayer that a position has a more
likely than not chance of success, then, at least as to that taxpayer and that tax
position, the position does meet that standard, since taxpayers are generally
allowed to rely on the advice of tax experts.248 While predicting whether
something has a certain chance of success is in most cases difficult if not
impossible to calculate, by the same token, proving that a position does not
meet that chance of success standard is equally difficult to prove, especially in
the context of negligence penalties. Thus, under the predictive standards as
applied to tax law, the more likely than not standard turns legal realism on its
head by making the law what the lawyer says it is, since, for purposes of the
reliance defense, the lawyer‘s determination that a position meets the more
likely than not standard makes it so. Accordingly, basing the standard for tax
advice on a chance of success is both unrealistic and ripe for abuse. The
standard should be based on what the lawyer believes the law is. Focusing on
the law itself, rather than on some mythical chance of success, more properly
emphasizes the role of tax advisors and puts the responsibility squarely on
advisors‘ shoulders.
2. Disclosure
The second fundamental problem with the new tax advice rules is related
to the issues of disclosure. Those return positions that do not meet, or cannot
definitively be said to have met, either the more likely than not standard or the
substantial authority standard must be disclosed. Notice 2008-14 outlines the
nuts-and-bolts procedures for how a taxpayer is to disclose a position.
However, neither the Notice nor any other guidance informs taxpayers or their
advisors as to how much information must be disclosed for it to be a sufficient
disclosure to avoid penalties. 249 A simple example might prove useful:
Suppose you are advising clients, Dr. and Dr. Smith, who are both physicians.
In addition to their downtown condo, the Smiths own a pied-de-terre to which
they repair each weekend. They raise and train horses on the farm, and their
plan is to sell horses at some point and make a profit. This year, as with each
year in the past, the farm has lost money. The Smiths would like to claim an
ordinary business loss deduction on their Form 1040 for the farm and ask your
advice. During the course of the many conversations you have had with the
Smiths, you learn that they have three teenage daughters, each of whom is

248. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4 (2007).
249. For example, Treasury Regulation section 1.6662-4(f)(1) merely provides: ―Disclosure is
adequate with respect to an item . . . if the disclosure is made on a properly completed form attached
to the return . . . .‖ The regulations do not define or explain what amount of disclosure is ―adequate.‖
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(f)(1) (2007). The Revenue Procedures in this area suffer from the same lack
of specificity. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2001-52, 2001-46 I.R.B. 491.
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crazy about horses and riding. While the clients hope to sell the horses they
are raising, their daughters are resisting any effort to sell ―their pets.‖
This, of course, is the classic hobby loss scenario. Given the law in this
area, it would be difficult to determine that the Smiths have a more likely than
not chance of succeeding on the hobby loss issue, and a disclosure would be
necessary.250 If they claim a loss from the horse farm, what must be disclosed
in order for the disclosure to be sufficient? Must the taxpayers disclose that it
is a potential hobby loss, that their children ride the horses, that the farm has
lost money each year, or that their daughters consider the horses to be pets
and not inventory? Those taxpayers and their advisors who want to make
adequate disclosures but not raise unnecessary red flags are given little
guidance in the new disclose-everything regime.
Beyond the practical difficulties with disclosure for those taxpayers and
their advisors who want to make sufficient disclosure, there is also a risk that
the disclosure regime will become the refuge of the knaves and villains much
in the way the tax shelter opinion itself was in the 1990s. First, for those
members of the tax bar who wish to conceal their knavery, the disclosure
statement will permit them to act as if they are complying, but without
providing truly helpful information. 251 The carefully-worded-but-eminentlymisleading disclosure statement will therefore become more about deceiving
the IRS than actually disclosing anything. The other risk is that the new
strategy will be to disclose everything regardless of whether the position is
settled or not. In some cases, over-disclosure will be made out of an excess of
caution, and there is little to be lost in disclosing transactions that the IRS will
ultimately bless.252 But the bar is also capable of flooding the government
with paper, thereby making it all the more difficult for the government to find
the truly useful disclosure. As Professor David Schizer noted, ―[t]here is no
penalty . . . for adding hay to the haystack, in order to make the needle harder
to find.‖253 With already low audit rates, the IRS simply does not have the
staffing to deal with the torrent of disclosure statements that may occur.254
Moreover, as Professor Boris Bittker noted a generation ago, Congress
should not fall back on the requirement of disclosure to resolve the
ambiguities inherent in the tax code. 255 The IRS is fully capable, given its
blanket authority to prescribe the forms taxpayers must use, of specifying the
250. See, e.g., Osteen v. Comm‘r, 62 F.3d 356, 358 (11th Cir. 1995).
251. Schizer, supra note 8, at 369.
252. Overreaction by the tax bar was indeed the response to the covered opinion rules. See
supra text accompanying notes 160–62.
253. Schizer, supra note 8, at 370.
254. See id. at 331–32.
255. Boris I. Bittker, Professional Responsibility and Federal Tax Practice, reprinted in
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 233, 255 (Boris Bittker ed., 1970).
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items that are frequently debatable, and ―the Internal Revenue Service ought
not to depend on a vague concept of taxpayer disclosure for debatable items
and transactions.‖256 The Treasury has lessened the impact of Congress‘s
disclosure mandate in the proposed regulations under § 6694 by allowing, in
essence, disclosure to the client. However, it is unclear whether Congress will
permit this emasculating of the preparer penalties to stand, and also whether
Congress will insist on full disclosure to the IRS of questionable positions. 257
Finally, if disclosure does become the new default position for taxpayers
and their advisors, this propensity to disclose could have serious implications
for the attorney-client privilege in tax advice. The reach and contours of the
attorney-client privilege in tax matters is murky at best, with some courts
holding that return advice is not subject to the privilege. 258 What is evident,
however, is that when a position is disclosed on a return, the privilege is
waived. 259 Thus, by establishing a system in which disclosure is more or less
compelled, Congress and the Treasury are essentially requiring taxpayers to
waive the attorney-client privilege in many instances. While I do not believe
Congress‘s nudging toward more disclosure is part of a concerted effort to
undermine the attorney-client privilege, 260 it may, nevertheless, be an
unintended consequence.
Accordingly, as with the covered opinion rules in which the arcane
provisions begat disclaimers rather than advice, the amendments to § 6694,
which could result in the imposition of substantial penalties and the waiver of
the attorney-client privilege, will mean that fewer taxpayers are given useful
tax advice. As discussed above, this result is antithetical to sound tax
administration.261
IV. TOWARD A MORE BENEFICIAL STANDARD FOR TAX ADVICE
While it is tempting to remain on the sidelines and merely jeer at those in
the game, in this part, I will set forth what I believe to be a better, more
straightforward, standard for tax advice. I start with the premise that whatever
rules or standards are adopted, the rules or standards should both make tax

256. Id.
257. Disclosure has been one of the mainstays of Congress‘s efforts to combat tax shelters.
See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 6011(a), 6707A(a) (2000). It is therefore likely that Congress will continue to
require real disclosure.
258. E.g., United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 500–01 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v.
KPMG, 237 F. Supp. 2d 35, 39 (D.D.C. 2002).
259. See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 2292–2320
(1961).
260. But see United States v. Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 154–55 (D.R.I. 2007) (refusing
to enforce IRS summons for tax accrual work papers).
261. See supra text accompanying notes 169–72.
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shelters and other abusive transactions more difficult and facilitate legitimate
tax advice and legitimate tax planning.262 While tax shelters need to be dealt
with, and I have no quarrel with going after shelter promoters, investors, and
the professionals who advise them, the vast majority of taxpayers are simply
trying to navigate their way through the system and the vast majority of tax
professionals are just trying to find the right answer. The tax advice rules
should not be geared only toward stopping the bad actors, thereby making
legitimate tax advice more difficult. Rather, given the complexity of tax law
and the ubiquitous nature of taxes, an effective tax system requires that
knowledgeable tax professionals properly advise their clients. The recent
actions by Congress and the Treasury get in the way of professionals
providing this advice. Thus, the new provisions threaten to create an
environment where taxpayers are less well-advised and the only taxpayers and
professionals who do any type of planning or receive any kind of advice are
those with the highest risk tolerance. This is not good for anyone.263
So where should we go from here? We cannot return to the status quo
ante of realistic possibility of success or the wild-west days of the prereasonable basis era. History has shown that those standards are unworkable
and many of the criticisms leveled against the recent amendments can be
aimed even more pointedly at the prior standards. It would also be naïve to
think that policy makers would lower standards in the face of the tax shelter
problem. 264
An antecedent inquiry is whether the new canon should be a rule or a
standard. As Brian Galle has noted, the tax academy has arrived rather late to
the rules-versus-standards debate and interpretive theory, 265 but much has
been written outside the tax literature on the efficacy of adopting a rule or set
of rules to deal with specific issues as opposed to a standard of more general
application.266 Resolving this rich debate is far beyond the scope of this

262. See Weisbach, supra note 6, at 222.
263. As Lester Thurow stated:
No modern tax system or society can work without honest voluntary
compliance and cooperation from nearly all of its citizens. . . . The Internal
Revenue Service can collect taxes from the dishonest few, but it cannot collect
taxes from a dishonest majority or even a large minority. When everyone begins
to feel that he is a ―sucker‖ if he pays taxes, it is only a matter of time until the
tax system collapses. America is close to this point.
Lester C. Thurow, The Dishonest Economy, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 21, 1985, at 35.
264. As Austin Powers so eloquently stated, ―That train has sailed.‖ AUSTIN POWERS: THE
SPY WHO SHAGGED ME (New Line Cinema 1999).
265. Galle, supra note 1, at 358.
266. See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65,
65–66 (1983); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
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Article. Without diminishing the distinctions, I do not believe that in our
context it is an either-or question. Rules certainly have had a salutary impact
on shelters in the past. The enactment of the passive activity loss and at-risk
rules essentially shut down the shelter industry that thrived in the 1970s and
early 1980s.267 However, as Professors Marvin A. Chirelstein and Lawrence
A. Zelenak point out, narrowly tailored legislative responses to particular
types of shelters are not an adequate solution to the shelter problem overall. 268
While many rules do indeed close loopholes, they also create a fixed target at
which tax lawyers may then aim. Perhaps the best example of this is the use
of the anti-Logan installment sales regulations by the taxpayer in ACM
Partnership v. Commissioner.269 Moreover, any rules adopted would be
prospective in application and, like the adage applied to generals, Congress is
always fighting the last tax shelter war. It simply cannot keep up. 270 Thus,
while rules do have their place, standards must be used to fill the gap.
More importantly, rules designed to thwart tax shelters are only designed
to do just that—stop shelters. They offer little in the way of defining
legitimate tax advice. Indeed, as discussed at length above, a key problem
with the recent anti-shelter initiatives is that they make legitimate tax planning
more difficult. Thus, the standard or rule must promote legitimate tax advice
while deterring abusive transactions. Standards, because of their more general
application, are better at this.
A. The Statute is the Thing
In formulating an appropriate standard for return advice, one must first
take into account the nature of the tax return, i.e., what it is that a return is
supposed to do. While there are other views of what a tax return is designed
to accomplish, our tax system has been based primarily on what Professor
REV. 1685, 1706 (1976); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 398 (1985);
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 62
(1992).
267. See 26 U.S.C. § 465 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); 26 U.S.C. § 469 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
268. Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1953. Professors Chirelstein and Zelenak‘s
proposal to combat tax shelters is to have Congress enact a Code provision disallowing all
noneconomic losses. Id. at 1952. Other scholars have offered other solutions to the tax shelter
problem in recent years. See, e.g., Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 1, at 59–60; Schler, supra note
1, at 367–83; Alexandra M. Walsh, Formally Legal, Probably Wrong: Corporate Tax Shelters,
Practical Reason and the New Textualism, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1541, 1545–46 (2001). Each of these
solutions has merit; however, a full discussion and dissection of these proposals is beyond the scope
of this Article.
269. 157 F.3d 231, 234 (3d Cir. 1998). The taxpayer in ACM Partnership used regulations
designed to prevent accelerated recovery of basis in an installment sale, known as the anti-Logan
installment sales regulations, to devise an elegant, and nearly successful, tax avoidance scheme. See
generally id.
270. Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1953.
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Bittker refers to as the ―honest-belief approach.‖271 Returns are signed under
penalty of perjury that they are true, correct, and complete to the best of the
taxpayer‘s knowledge. Thus, tax returns are viewed as expressing taxpayers‘
opinions of their liability under the tax laws, and taxpayers discharge this
obligation to the government by expressing this opinion honestly. 272 The
negligence penalty and the relief from that penalty has, since 1918, been
based on the idea that taxpayers may have an honest disagreement with the
government as to the meaning of certain Code provisions, and that taxpayers
should not be punished for such an honest disagreement. 273 Finally, and
perhaps most important to our inquiry into tax advisor standards, the reliance
defense to the accuracy-related and fraud penalties is premised on the idea
that taxpayers may reasonably rely on the advice of experts in attempting to
discharge their obligations under the law.274
If tax returns are indeed the honest attempts of taxpayers to report their
income and expenses, tax advisors may only satisfy their role in the system by
helping their clients meet that obligation. 275 The reliance-on-counsel defense
is based on the premise that tax law is unknowable to most mortals and that
taxpayers may utilize experts with more knowledge of the law to help them
satisfy their obligations under the law. It is not a license to be more
aggressive, nor is the defense designed to provide lucrative incomes to
lawyers and accountants. Thus, the role of advisors is to assist their clients in
honestly reporting income and deductions. 276 Advisors will disagree about the
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Bittker, supra note 255, at 254.
Rowen, supra note 82, at 250.
See supra text accompanying notes 60–72.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4 (2007).
See Falk, supra note 18, at 660.
Whether he is a tax cheater or Justice Holmes, the taxpayer seeks the
attorney‘s advice about what tax law requires. When tax law is uncertain, the
attorney‘s advice will concern legal risks and depend on the client‘s attitude.
Some clients are aggressive, others conservative, and others leave it to the
attorney to decide what risks to take. But uncertainty in the law—a condition
hardly unique to tax law—does not alter the attorney‘s basic advising function.
The attorney advisor tells the client what it takes to comply with the law.

Id.
276. Returning again to first principles, Canon 32 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, which
were adopted by the ABA in 1908, provides:
[The lawyer] must also observe and advise his client to observe the statut[ory]
law, though until a statute shall have been construed and interpreted by
competent adjudication, he is free and is entitled to advise as to its validity and as
to what he conscientiously believes to be its just meaning and extent.
ABA Comm. on Code of Prof‘l Ethics, Final Rep. (1908). Thus, Canon 32 does not dictate that
lawyers make whatever arguments they deem reasonable or arguable, but rather to advise as to what
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meaning of words and phrases. However, in dealing with ambiguous
provisions in the Code, taxpayers and their advisors must attempt to discern
what Congress meant in enacting a given provision.277 This in turn requires
the advisor to focus on the language of the statute at issue. The practice of
law, including tax law, is fundamentally the practice of statutory
interpretation, and the tax advice standard should require advisors to focus on
the language of the Code. 278
The risk of basing the tax advice standard on the text itself is, of course,
that such a formulation will only play into the hands of the hyper-textualists
who have been the cause of the current plague of shelters and other abusive
transactions.279 After all, the courts have dealt with many of these shelters
using a broad economic substance or business purpose doctrine. These tests
are needed, so the argument goes, to override the tendency of lawyers and
accountants to view the Code in isolation. In the next section, I will show that
the economic substance and business purpose doctrines have drifted far from
their original moorings and that the true focus of those doctrines is consistent
with my proposed standard that focuses on the language and purpose of the
statute at issue. Moreover, the economic substance and business purpose tests
have only clouded the inquiry and often offer little to the analysis of whether a
transaction is proper.280 I will analyze the economic substance test in the
context of the British House of Lords‘ recent opinion in MacNiven v.
Westmoreland Investments Ltd.,281 which rejected a broad-based economic
they conscientiously believe the statute‘s meaning to be. Rowen, supra note 82, at 246.
277. Falk, supra note 18, at 658 (―In the debate over Proposed Opinion 314 Revision, both
sides ‗did not question the desirability of congruence between the minimum ethical and penalty
standards.‘ Yet, it can only confuse matters to treat the attorney‘s ethical obligation as requiring
something other than advice on compliance with the law.‖ (footnotes omitted)).
278. Galle, supra note 1, at 358.
279. See, e.g., Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 1, at 4.
Under the textualist approach, it is much easier for an attorney to write a
favorable opinion for transactions that are designed to comply with the letter of
the law, but not its spirit, for at least two reasons. First, the attorney is
permitted to ignore, or at least downplay, any legislative history that would
argue against, or undercut, the desired tax results. Second, under a textualist
approach, it is arguable that various well-accepted judicial doctrines, such as the
business purpose doctrine, are suspect. At the extreme, a textualist might argue
that these doctrines are the product of judicial activism and either should no
longer be followed, or at a minimum should not be extended into new areas of
the law.
Id. Cunningham and Repetti blame the ascendancy of textualism for the recent tax shelter crisis. Id.
280. Cf. Percy H. Winfield, Ethics in English Case Law, 45 HARV. L. REV. 112, 115 (1931)
(quoting Lord Justice Bowen‘s statement that the state of ―a man‘s mind is as much an ascertainable
fact as the state of his digestion‖).
281. [2001] UKHL 6, [2003] 1 A.C. 311, ¶ 29 (UKHC).
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substance doctrine in favor of a standard that examines the meaning of the
statute and intent of the legislator.
B. MacNiven v. Westmoreland
As economic substance cases go, the transaction in MacNiven was quite
straightforward.282 The issue in MacNiven was whether an interest deduction
should be allowed on amounts paid from a subsidiary to its parent. 283 The
taxpayer, Westmoreland Investments Ltd., owed the trustees of its parent, the
Electricity Supply Pension Scheme, over £70 million, including more than
£40 million in accrued interest.284 Westmoreland‘s liabilities greatly exceeded
its assets, and all the liabilities were owed to the trustees. 285 Given this rather
bleak balance sheet, Westmoreland was valueless with no great expectations
of a turnaround, and it would have a dickens of a time finding a buyer.286 But
Westmoreland did have one potential asset, which ironically was also its
biggest liability—its substantial accrued interest liability. 287 Under section
338 of the United Kingdom‘s Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988,
―payments of interest, other than interest on bank loans, may be set against
profits, and any unused excess may be carried forward under section 75 of the
Taxes Act 1988.‖288 Thus, if Westmoreland could pay the pension scheme
trustees the £40 million of interest it owed, it would have value as a company
with substantial established tax losses. 289 A purchaser could then transfer
income-producing assets to Westmoreland and take advantage of the losses to
offset any future profits.290
But first Westmoreland had to pay the interest it owed to the trustees of
the pension scheme. 291 Westmoreland was obviously unable to make any
payments out of its own resources, and no bank or other third party was likely
to loan it the £40 million necessary. 292 As a result, the trustees of the pension
scheme itself lent the money to Westmoreland, which then used the funds to
pay off its interest liability, claiming an interest deduction for the amount
paid.293 Significant to the House of Lords‘ opinion, the initial trier of fact
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Compare ACM P‘ship v. Comm‘r, 157 F. 3d 231, 239–42 (3d Cir. 1998).
MacNiven, 1 A.C. 311, ¶ 19.
Id. ¶ 9. The word ―scheme‖ does not appear to be used in the pejorative American sense.
Id.
Id. ¶ 10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 11.
Id.
Id.
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found ―that the steps involved in these transactions were genuine,‖ and there
was no allegation that any of the steps were shams. 294
The case ultimately came before the House of Lords on the issue of
whether the interest deduction claimed by Westmoreland should be
allowed. 295 The government‘s position was that the amounts paid by
Westmoreland did not constitute ―payments‖ within the meaning of section
338 because the payments had no commercial purpose, were purely for the
purpose of avoiding tax, and therefore fell within the Ramsay principle. 296
The Ramsay principle, from W.T. Ramsay Ltd. v. Inland Revenue
Commissioners,297 is the House of Lords‘ iteration of the economic substance
and business purpose doctrines. 298 The position of Westmoreland was that the
payments made to the trustees of the pension scheme were legitimate
transactions that met the definition of ―payment‖ within the meaning of the
statute.299 The House of Lords was therefore required to determine whether
transactions that meet the terms of the statute, but which may have no
apparent commercial purpose, should be respected for tax purposes. 300
Giving the main speech for the House was Lord Hoffmann, who began by
rejecting the Crown‘s broad application of the Ramsay principle. 301 Finding
that the Ramsay principal was being applied as ―an overriding legal principle,
superimposed upon the whole of revenue law without regard to the language
or purpose of any particular provision,‖ Lord Hoffmann held that there is
―ultimately only one principle of construction, namely to ascertain what
Parliament meant by using the language of the statute.‖ 302
294. Id. ¶ 12.
295. Id. ¶ 19.
296. Id. ¶ 27.
297. [1982] A.C. 300 (H.L.).
298. MacNiven, 1 A.C. 311, ¶¶ 30–32. Notably, the Ramsay principle traces its lineage to the
opinion of Judge Hand in Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934). See infra text
accompanying notes 313–17.
299. MacNiven, 1 A.C. 311, ¶ 19.
300. Id.
301. Id. ¶ 28–29.
302. Id. ¶ 29. It is fair to say that the U.S. courts‘ usage and treatment of the economic
substance, business purpose, and sham transaction doctrines have not been consistent. A complete
treatment of these doctrines in the U.S. courts is well beyond the scope of this Article. For an
excellent summary of these cases, see Leland Gardner, An Elephant in the Room: Double Deductions
and the Economic Substance Doctrine in Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, 60 TAX LAW. 519
(2007). As Gardner explains, the courts of appeals use essentially three approaches in analyzing
transactions. ―Some circuits apply a conjunctive test: a transaction must satisfy both the business
purpose and the economic substance inquiries.‖ Id. at 525–26. See, e.g., Illes v. Comm‘r, 982 F.2d
163, 165 (6th Cir. 1992); Shriver v. Comm‘r, 899 F.2d 724, 725–26 (8th Cir. 1990); Rice‘s Toyota
World, Inc. v. Comm‘r, 752 F.2d 89, 91 (4th Cir. 1985). Other circuits use a disjunctive test and
consider each of the tests independently and may disregard a transaction if it lacks either a business
purpose or economic substance. See, e.g., Nicole Rose Corp. v. Comm‘r, 320 F.3d 282, 284 (2d Cir.
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Lord Hoffmann began his support of this form of textualism, which he has
referred to as the ―purposive approach,‖ with the idea that words and phrases
used in the law, particularly freestanding codes like the income tax, have their
own independent meaning.303 For example, when an economist says that
―real‖ income has fallen, the economist is not intending to contrast real
incomes with imaginary ones.304 Rather, the comparison is between incomes
that have been adjusted for inflation and those that have not. Thus, in order to
know what an economist means by ―real,‖ one must first identify what Lord
Hoffmann referred to as the ―relevant concept‖ (in this example, inflation
adjustment) by reference to which speaker is using the word. 305
Lord Hoffmann then pointed out that tax statutes often use terms and refer
to purely legal concepts that have no meaning (or at least a different meaning)
outside the tax laws.306 For example, the term ―basis‖ is a term of common
understanding in tax law, but its tax definition only has meaning in the unique
world of tax law.307 In viewing these statutes, one must examine them within
the relevant concept of the particular Code provision and statutory schema. 308
2002); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Comm‘r, 254 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 2001); ASA Investerings
P‘ship v. Comm‘r, 201 F.3d 505, 513 (D.C. Cir. 2000). And other circuits apply a unitary test
considering business purpose and economic substance as factors to inform a sham transaction
analysis. See, e.g., ACM P‘ship v. Comm‘r, 157 F.3d 231, 246 n.29 (3d Cir. 1998); Casebeer v.
Comm‘r, 909 F.2d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990); James v. Comm‘r, 899 F.2d 905, 908–09 (10th Cir.
1990). In addition to three different approaches, courts have also applied the tests in numerous,
mind-numbing ways. Some courts apply a pro-taxpayer presumption, where the transaction will be
allowable if it possesses either a business purpose or economic substance. See, e.g., Black & Decker
Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 440 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Wexler, 31 F.3d 117, 127
(3d Cir. 1994). Other courts apply the opposite presumption: the transaction will be disallowable if it
lacks either a business purpose or economic substance. See, e.g., Black & Decker Corp., 436 F.3d at
440; Wexler, 31 F.3d at 127. Moreover, some courts have conflated the economic substance doctrine
with the sham transaction doctrine. See, e.g., Black & Decker Corp., 436 F.3d at 440; Wexler, 31
F.3d at 127.
303. MacNiven, 1 A.C. 311, ¶¶ 40–46.
304. Id. ¶ 40.
305. Id. ¶ 58. This approach is consistent with modern textualist interpretation, which holds
that language only has meaning in context. Modern textualists therefore often resort to extrastatutory
contextual clues. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 14, at 75–76.
306. MacNiven, 1 A.C. 311, ¶ 58.
307. 26 U.S.C.A. § 1016 (West 2007). Lord Hoffmann used the example of whether a stamp
duty is payable upon a ―conveyance or transfer on sale‖ pursuant to Schedule 13, paragraph 1(1) to
the Finance Act 1999. MacNiven, 1 A.C. 311, ¶ 58. ―[T]he statutory language defines the document
subject to duty essentially by reference to external legal concepts such as ‗conveyance‘ and ‗sale.‘‖
Id.
308. As Professor Manning points out, modern textualism is thus consistent with
Wittgenstein‘s insights about language. Manning, supra note 14, at 79 n.29 (quoting Cont‘l Can Co.
v. Chi. Truck Drivers, 916 F.2d 1154, 1157 (7th Cir. 1990) (―You don‘t have to be Ludwig
Wittgenstein or Hans-Georg Gadamer to know that successful communication depends on meanings
shared by interpretive communities.‖); LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS
§§ 134–42 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1958) (emphasizing ―the use of words in linguistic
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Lord Hoffmann then addressed whether general principles like the
Ramsay principle could be used to decide whether the taxpayer‘s actions
constituted acceptable tax mitigation or unacceptable tax avoidance. 309 Lord
Hoffmann held that when the statutory provisions at issue do not contain
words like ―avoidance‖ or ―mitigation,‖ it does not help to introduce them. 310
Thus, whether steps that are taken for the avoidance of tax are acceptable or
unacceptable is the conclusion at which one arrives by applying the statutory
language to the facts of the case, rather than a test for deciding whether the
statute applies or not.311 Lord Hoffmann argued that it does not promote
―clarity of thought‖ to use terms like ―stratagem or device.‖ 312 Transactions
either work or they do not.
If they do not work, the reason . . . is simply that upon the
true construction of the statute, the transaction which was
designed to avoid the charge to tax actually comes within it.
It is not that the statute has a penumbral spirit which strikes
down devices or stratagems designed to avoid its terms or
exploit its loopholes.313
The House of Lords therefore allowed the deduction. 314
MacNiven thus stands for the proposition that in evaluating the reach of a
statute, one must employ a ―purposive approach‖ to determine the nature of
the transaction to which it was intended to apply and then to decide whether
the actual transaction (which might involve considering the overall effect of a
number of elements intended to operate together) answers to the statutory
description. This means that the question is always whether the relevant
interactions within the relevant community‖)).
309. MacNiven, 1 A.C. 311, ¶ 58.
310. Id. ¶ 62.
311. Id.; see also PAUL, supra note 5, at 91–92.
In the field of tax avoidance there is special need to be distrustful of glib rules
of thumb and formulae masquerading as authoritative general principles—
special need because the general propositions commonly employed in the
subject are so broad and have such an elastic vocabulary. Words like ―reality,‖
―fiction,‖ ―essence,‖ ―form,‖ and ―substance‖ have little displacement, and
usually mean little more than what is desired for the occasion. They are
amorphous, question-begging words without fixed content, and their chief
function is to make an unsure conclusion sound well.
PAUL, supra note 5, at 90–91 (footnotes omitted).
312. MacNiven, 1 A.C. 311, ¶ 62.
313. Id. ¶ 62 (quoting Norglen Ltd. v. Reeds Rains Prudential Ltd. [1999] 2 A.C. 1, 13–14
(H.L.)) (citations omitted).
314. Id. ¶ 74.
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provision of the statute, upon its true construction, applies to the facts of a
particular case.315
In an article published in the British Tax Review,316 Lord Hoffmann
explains that the ―purposive construction‖ he applied to tax statutes in
MacNiven had as its origin Judge Hand‘s opinion in Helvering v. Gregory. 317
The irony of using the source of the economic substance and business purpose
doctrines to overturn a broad economic substance doctrine was not lost on
Lord Hoffmann, who used the genesis of those doctrines as part of his call to
return the focus to the statute. Quoting at length from Judge Hand‘s opinion
in Gregory, in which Judge Hand finds that Ms. Gregory‘s plan for a
corporate reorganization318 was not entitled to tax free treatment because her
artificial scheme was ―not what the statute means by a ‗reorganization,‘‖ Lord
Hoffmann argues that Judge Hand‘s decision is based on statutory
construction and not some overriding business purpose doctrine. 319 According

315. Id. ¶ 8 (Nicholls of Birkenhead, L.J.).
316. Leonard Hoffmann, Tax Avoidance, 2 B.T.R. 197 (2005).
317. See id. at 197–99. Lord Hoffmann has also applied this purposive construction to patent
disputes. See, e.g., Kirin-Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd. [2004] UKHL 46, [2005] 1 All
E.R. 667 (UKHL) (Hoffmann, L.J.).
―Purposive construction‖ does not mean that one is extending or going beyond
the definition of the technical matter for which the patentee seeks protection in
the claims. The question is always what the person skilled in the art would have
understood the patentee to be using the language of the claim to mean. And for
this purpose, the language he has chosen is usually of critical importance.
Id. ¶ 34.
318. In Gregory, the taxpayer was the sole shareholder of a corporation holding appreciated
shares of a subsidiary corporation. In an attempt to distribute these appreciated shares to herself
without the transaction being taxed as a dividend, the taxpayer organized a new corporation,
transferred the shares to the new corporation, and immediately dissolved the new corporation. As the
sole shareholder of the new corporation, Gregory received the shares. Gregory then sold the shares
and paid tax on the proceeds at the capital gain rate. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir.
1934).
319. Hoffmann, supra note 316, at 197–98. Lord Hoffmann quoted the following language
from Judge Hand‘s opinion:
If what was done here was what was intended by [the statute], it is of no
consequence that it was all an elaborate scheme to get rid of income tax, as it
certainly was. . . . [But] the purpose of the section is plain enough; men engaged
in enterprises . . . might wish to consolidate, or divide, to add to, or subtract
from, their holdings. Such transactions were not to be considered as realizing
any profit, because the collective interests still remained in solution. But the
underlying presupposition is plain that the readjustment shall be undertaken for
reasons germane to the conduct of the venture in hand, not as an ephemeral
incident, egregious to its prosecution . . . . We cannot treat as inoperative the
transfer of shares . . . . The transfer passed title . . . and the taxpayer became a
shareholder in the transferee. All these steps were real and their only defect was
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to Lord Hoffmann, the reorganization in Gregory was not given tax-free
treatment because the concept of a ―plan of reorgani[z]ation‖ in the statute
contemplates doing something for a business purpose and not solely to avoid
tax.320 Thus, the requirement of a business purpose was dictated by the statute
itself, and Judge Hand did not apply any rule taken from outside the statute.
Gregory cannot, according to Lord Hoffmann, be read to hold that
whatever the provisions of a statute might be, a transaction that has no
business purpose will not be respected for tax purposes. 321 As discussed
above, there are too many instances in the Code in which transactions entered
into solely for tax purposes are respected for there to be any real viability to
such a broad application of the rule.322 Lord Hoffmann asserts that tax
avoidance should be a contradiction in terms, if by tax avoidance we mean
transactions successfully structured to avoid a tax that the legislature intended
to impose. 323 The only way in which a legislature can express an intention to
impose a tax is by a statute that imposes such a tax.324
Lord Hoffmann asserts that he is applying a ―purposive construction‖ to a
text.325 However, while styling himself as a purposivist, Lord Hoffmann is, in
reality, a modern textualist. In his recent article, What Divides Textualists
from Purposivists?,326 Professor John Manning discusses the common ground,
as well as the differences between purposivists and textualists. Professor
Manning argues that purposivists from the legal process tradition believe that
it is unrealistic to believe ―that Congress collectively knows or cares about the
semantic detail of often complex statutes.‖327 For purposivists, enforcing the
purpose or policy of a statute, rather than the minutiae of its semantic detail,
better serves the legislative supremacy that they argue textualists are trying to
defend.328 Professor Manning argues that in contrast, textualists believe that
the purposivist approach ignores the legislative compromise that created the
particular text at issue.329 Textualists assert that legislative supremacy is best
served by ―attributing to legislators the understanding that a reasonable person
conversant with applicable conventions would attach to the enacted text in
that they were not what the statute means by a ‗reorganisation‘ [sic].
Id. at 197–98 (quoting Gregory, 69 F.2d at 810–11).
320. Id. at 198.
321. Id. at 199.
322. See supra note 11.
323. Hoffman, supra note 316, at 206.
324. See id.
325. Id.
326. Manning, supra note 14, at 70.
327. Id. at 91.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 92.
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context.‖330 Textualists point out that purposivism cannot deal adequately
with legislative compromise because semantic detail, in the end, is the only
way legislators can actually set forth the agreed-upon legislative
compromise. 331 Despite the significant differences, recent scholarship has
recognized the common ground among modern textualism and modern
purposivism. 332 Modern textualists are cognizant of context as well as text,
while modern purposivists give great weight to statutory text. 333
Given the common ground, what differentiates modern purposivists and
textualists is that purposivists will give deference to the policy concerns
underlying the legislative choice, even when those policies are contrary to the
language of the text.334 It is in this vein that Lord Hoffmann and his opinion
in MacNiven part company with the purposivists. The problem with using
policies like business purpose or economic substance is that these are not
consistent policies throughout the Code.335 As indicated, there are numerous
instances in which transactions entered into solely for tax purposes are
perfectly acceptable and no business purpose is required for those positions to
be upheld. 336 To paraphrase Lord Hoffmann, one cannot superimpose the
economic substance and business purposes as overriding legal principles upon
the whole Internal Revenue Code without regard to the language or purpose of
any particular provision.337
Thus, Lord Hoffmann‘s purposive construction is in reality textualism in
which one looks at the purpose or policy behind the particular statute at issue,
rather than some overarching policy permeating the entire Code. Given the
capricious use of the economic substance doctrines, MacNiven is a clearer
treatment of shelters and provides a more principled basis for evaluating
whether a transaction is legitimate tax planning or an abusive tax shelter. The
purposivist construction of MacNiven provides a real service to tax analysis:
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 75 (citing Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re
Speaking?” Why Intention Free Interpretation is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 974–
78 (2004) (arguing that textualism is, at root, a form of intentionalism); Caleb Nelson, What is
Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 353 (2005)).
333. Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3, 35 (2006).
334. Manning, supra note 14, at 96.
335. See, e.g., PAUL, supra note 5, at 90 (Economic substance and business purpose doctrines
are too often maxims that ―have little displacement, and usually mean little more than what is desired
for the occasion.‖).
336. Indeed, Professors Chirelstein and Zelenak in their proposal that would disallow
noneconomic losses would permit some noneconomic losses to be deductible, noting that ―Congress
would not want to disallow every type of noneconomic loss, and that some mechanism is needed to
separate the deductible wheat from the nondeductible chaff.‖ Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 1, at
1955.
337. MacNiven v. Westmoreland Invs. Ltd. [2001] UKHL 6, [2003] 1 A.C. 311, ¶ 29 (UKHC).
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textualists may not rely solely on the text, applying it out of context or
contrary to the purpose for which a particular tax statute was enacted. Nor
may the purposivists indiscriminately fire policies like business purpose or
economic substance to overturn the otherwise plain meaning of texts. The
MacNiven doctrine recognizes that tax definitions are unique to the Code and
that there is no economic substance apart from the legal definition the Code
places on these definitions. When we say something lacks a business purpose
or lacks economic substance, what we are saying is that the purpose or
substance behind the action is not that which was contemplated by the statute.
Therefore, we should focus on the purpose for which the statute was enacted,
focusing primarily on the language Congress used. 338
Many have decried the rise of textualism in tax advice and lay the blame
for the increase in shelter activity at the feet of the textualists. 339 I fully
recognize that rejecting a broad application of the economic substance and
business purpose doctrines will likely be ill-received. However, in my view,
the problem with the strain of textualism that has given rise to tax shelters is
not that these lawyers focused too much on the text. Rather, the problem lies
in the fact that they applied the text out of context and inconsistent with the
338. Focusing on both the text of the statute and the purposes for which that provision was
enacted is important not only for properly interpreting the tax laws but also for promoting
compliance with and respect for the law. Freedman, supra note 43, at 346. Taxpayers often enter
into transactions structured in a way to maximize tax benefits b ecause they have been advised by
accountants to structure them in that manner. Some taxpayers do not truly need structures like S
corporations for their business operations, but they have been advised that this is the way to set up a
business in a tax-efficient way. And if they find the advice odd, they simply believe this is one of the
mysterious things about the way the tax system works. If taxpayers are then told that they cannot
structure a transaction in a certain way because it was done solely for tax purposes, they are left more
than a little perplexed. As Professor Freedman asks:
What message are such people being given by the tax system? Are they to think
of tax in terms of economic reality, fairness and rationality when it at first
appears that incorporation will legitimately save tax and they then find that
some of those benefits have been negated in a complex way that will probably
cost them considerable amounts in professional fees? The law has real
substance here because it has consequences in terms of rights and obligations. . .
. Right from the start he has been given a signal that it is necessary to take
account of taxation when making commercial decisions and that the rules can
change. The culture of artificiality is established and so it continues. . . . In the
light of this, it is not surprising that business owners will soon come to believe
that it is perfectly natural to do artificial things for tax purposes and that this
impression permeates right up the scale to large companies whose directors,
used to tax impacting on all their decisions, consider it fair game to take tax into
consideration in all planning and then to go on to undertake tax driven activities.
Id. at 344–45. One of the reasons for attacking tax shelters is that it breeds cynicism toward the tax
system. But the ad hoc use of maxims like business purpose does the same thing.
339. See Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 1, at 4; Galle, supra note 1, at 359–60; Weisbach,
supra note 6, at 222.
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true purpose of the statute. The gamesmanship engendered by the realistic
possibility of success and the more likely than not standards only adds to
these problems.
In addition, as Professor David A. Weisbach has noted, the use of
purposivist doctrines like economic substance and business purpose have
made shelters more exotic and complicated. 340 The basis of these doctrines is
that transactions undertaken solely for tax purposes are disallowed. The
doctrines thus create the incentive to put just enough window dressing—some
business activity, some element of risk—to pass the business purpose or
economic substance test.341 By encouraging the addition of layers of entities
and transactions, these doctrines have had the perverse effect of making
modern shelters more complicated and therefore more difficult to detect. The
solution is to return advisors to the text, not to further divorce them from it.
Fidelity to the statute simply is not the cause of shelters.
Moreover, in many instances, the creation and promotion of tax shelters
was the result of out-and-out fraud and was not the result of a misreading or
misapplication of complex doctrines. Just as Professors Chirelstein and
Zelenak‘s proposal would distinguish between traditional tax planning and
planning that generates abusive tax shelters,342 policy makers must distinguish
between aggressive tax planning and criminal tax fraud. We must recognize
that neither a silver bullet nor a broad-spectrum antibiotic343 will stop truly
fraudulent and abusive shelters. We should leave the eradication of these
types of shelters to law enforcement and develop a standard that will
encourage legitimate tax advice and discourage tax advice that amounts to
little more than game-playing.
C. Using the MacNiven Analysis as a Return Advice Standard
While the standard set forth in MacNiven is designed to be used by courts
in statutory construction, its principles can also provide guidance to lawyers in
advising clients. Like courts in the analysis of completed transactions, tax
advisors should apply a ―purposive textualist‖ approach to the Code. This
requires lawyers to give a purposive construction to the statute to determine
the nature of the transaction to which it was intended to apply and then to
decide whether the actual transaction (which might involve considering the
overall effect of a number of elements intended to operate together) is
consistent with the statutory description. This means that the question is

340.
341.
342.
343.

Weisbach, supra note 6, at 237.
Id. at 237–38.
Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1953–54.
Id. at 1951.
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always whether the language and purpose of the statute apply to the facts of
the transaction. 344
In employing a purposive construction to the Code, a tax lawyer must
look at the purpose for which the statute was enacted and attempt to apply the
statute consistently with its true nature and purpose. The primary focus
should always be the text of the statute. In most circumstances, the lawyer
will examine only the single Code provision at issue, while at other times, the
entire Code, and not just one provision in isolation, must be examined. If
relevant, the lawyer should also consult court opinions and legislative
history. 345
Accordingly, a correct and fair reading of the text itself, or ―the right
answer‖ if you will, should be the foundation of the standard. While this
purposive textualism standard can be formulated in a number of ways, my
standard is as follows:
A tax professional may advise a client to take a position if,
based on a good-faith and sound construction of the
applicable statutory provision, the position is consistent with
the statute and congressional intent.
The phrase ―sound construction of the applicable statutory provision‖ is
taken from the ABA Tax Section‘s Proposed Revision to Formal Opinion
314,346 while the phrase ―consistent with the statute and congressional intent‖
is taken from the principal purpose definition of the covered opinion rules. 347
This straightforward formulation, based not on chances of success but on the
text itself, will hopefully return tax advice to its original premise for which the
reliance defense was enacted. 348 The standard would require an advisor to
344. MacNiven v. Westmoreland Invs. Ltd. [2001] UKHL 6, [2003] 1 A.C. 311, ¶ 8 (UKHC)
(Nicholls of Birkenhead, L.J.).
345. Paul, supra note 34, at 417 (―The tax adviser must accept interstitial judicial legislation as
one of the realities of life. Legislative words are not inert, but derive vitality from the obvious
purpose at which they are aimed.‖).
346. The proposed revisions in turn borrowed this language from Proposed Treasury
Regulation § 1.6661–3(b)(3), 48 Fed. Reg. 10,862 (Mar. 15, 1983). Falk, supra note 18, at 656–57.
Unfortunately, for tax administration, the proposed revisions were not adopted by the ABA Rules
Committee, which elected to espouse the realistic possibility of success standard. Id.
347. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(10) (2007). The standard is also consistent with the portion
proposed regulations under § 6694 where a more likely than not conclusion cannot be reached
because of insufficient authorities: The proposed regulations provide that a ―tax return preparer may
reasonably believe that a position more likely than not would be sustained on its merits despite the
absence of other types of authority if the position is supported by a well-reasoned construction of the
applicable statutory provision.‖ Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694–2(b)(1), 73 Fed. Reg. 34,560, 34,574
(June 17, 2008) (emphasis added).
348. See supra text accompanying notes 60–75.
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employ a sound construction of the statute, which, if employed in good faith,
would reduce tax shelter advice. If the advisor, in good faith, believes a
position is consistent with the statute and congressional intent, that should be
sufficient for the advice to be given. If taxpayers reasonably rely on the
advice of competent advisors, then they can sign their returns under penalty of
perjury believing them to be true, correct, and complete. If there is substantial
authority for the position, taxpayers need not disclose their position under §
6662(d). 349 Likewise, if substantial authority does not exist, but an advisor
nevertheless believes the position meets the standard, an advisor may advise
the taxpayer to take the position without disclosing it.350
Will this standard put an end to tax shelters? Clearly not. The desire by
lawyers and accountants to make money and please clients will always create
pressures to take aggressive positions on tax returns.351 However, as I hope I
have shown, those pressures are exacerbated by a system (now, more than
forty years old) that encourages taxpayers and their advisors to push the
envelope of statutory interpretation. My modest proposal amounts to this: If
we change the question from ―what can I get away with?‖ to ―what is the right
answer?‖ we might get a better answer.
A good-faith belief would require a tax advisor to examine the entire
Code, legislative history, the Treasury‘s position in regulations and other
written guidance, as well as court cases. Nevertheless, an advisor still could
give good-faith advice on a position in the face of court cases and Treasury
regulations to the contrary, if the advisor believes the position represents a
sound construction of the statute and is consistent with the purpose of the
statute.352
D. Applying the Standard
The proposed standard would be consistent with the way in which many
tax advisors operate currently, and it would be consistent with much of the
advice already being given. Many advisors are already attempting to ascertain
the ―right answer,‖ and many clients just want to know what the tax law
requires. The standard is more important in cases where the client wishes to
be more aggressive. There will, of course, be cases in which reasonable
minds will differ as to whether a position represents a good-faith and sound
349. 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
350. This was the position of the committee that sought the revisions to ABA Formal Opinion
314. Matthew C. Ames, Formal Opinion 352: Professional Integrity and the Tax Audit Lottery, 1
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 421 (1987).
351. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 121, at 1577–78.
352. Professional responsibility dictates would require the lawyer, however, to inform his or
her clients that they could be subject to penalties for taking a position contrary to established
precedent. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
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construction of the applicable statutory provision that is consistent with the
statute and congressional intent. In order to examine the outer limits of the
proposed standard, I will analyze the standard in the context of two notable,
perhaps notorious, cases: Gitlitz v. Commissioner353 and ACM Partnership v.
Commissioner.354
1. Gitlitz v. Commissioner
In Gitlitz, the taxpayers were shareholders of an S corporation that had a
large amount of losses that could not be deducted because the shareholders
had insufficient basis in their stock (so-called ―suspended losses‖).355 The
corporation received cancellation of indebtedness income (―COD income‖),
which, because the corporation was insolvent at the time of the discharge, was
not subject to tax.356 The issue was whether the COD income was an ―item of
income‖ subject to pass-through under § 1366(a)(1)(A), which the
shareholders could then use to increase their basis in the corporation‘s stock,
thereby freeing up the suspended losses. 357 The Supreme Court held that the
COD income was an item of income and allowed the increase in basis. 358
Many have argued the Supreme Court‘s decision was incorrect. 359 However,
does the taxpayer‘s position represent a good-faith and sound construction of
the applicable statutory provision, and is the position consistent with the
statute and congressional intent?
The position of whether COD income was an ―item of income‖ for
purposes of § 1366 certainly had clear support in the statute and regulations.
Section 1366(a)(1) defined the term ―items of income,‖ to include ―taxexempt‖ income, 360 and Title 26 of the Code of Federal Regulations § 1.1367–
1(d)(2) provided: ―[A basis] adjustment for a nontaxable item is determined
for the taxable year in which the item would have been includible or

353. 531 U.S. 206 (2001).
354. 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998).
355. 26 U.S.C. § 1366(d) (2000); Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 210. Losses at the S corporation level
flow through to the shareholders of the corporation and reduce the shareholders‘ basis in their stock.
Losses in excess of basis are suspended until the shareholders increase their basis, thereby freeing up
the suspended losses.
356. 26 U.S.C. § 108(a) (2000); Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 210.
357. Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 212.
358. Id. at 218–19.
359. See, e.g., Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., What Were They Thinking? BB&T Versus Gitlitz, 120
TAX NOTES 793, 864–65 (2008); Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 1, at 17–20.
360. 26 U.S.C. § 1366(a)(1) (2000). The government chose instead to litigate the issue in the
face of the plain meaning of the statute and regulations. Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 212. While it is true that
the Treasury adopted new regulations tightening the definition of ―tax-exempt income,‖ those
regulations were adopted during the course of the litigation of Gitlitz and the other cases, and the
regulations proposed read curiously like the government‘s briefs filed with the courts in those cases.

2008]

“PURPOSIVE TEXTUALISM” AND TAX SHELTERS

89

deductible under the corporation‘s method of accounting for Federal income
tax purposes if the item had been subject to Federal income taxation.‖361
Hence, the Code and regulations appeared to contemplate basis increases for
tax-exempt or nontaxable items, and the taxpayer‘s position thus was at least
arguably a sound reading of the Code provisions at issue. 362 There was
certainly no obvious reading to the contrary, 363 and the result was consistent
with the congressional purpose of the statute to provide tax-free treatment to
discharges of indebtedness and to allow increases in basis for all items of
income, including tax-exempt income. 364 Even if one were to look outside the
language and purpose of the statutes, there was also no general purpose in the
Code preventing the result obtained—the lone dissenter in the Supreme Court
was left to resort to ―Congress‘s likely intent‖ that ambiguous statutes should
be read as ―closing, not maintaining, tax loopholes.‖365 Thus, while one may
disagree on a policy basis with the decision of the Court in Gitlitz,366 the
position was one that had strong support in the statute and regulations.367
Moreover, I submit that this is the type of issue for which tax advisors
should be able to give positive advice. First, the transactions were not entered
into to obtain the tax benefit, but were the result of real discharges of
indebtedness between unrelated parties.368 Thus, the taxpayers did not order
their affairs to obtain a certain result or create a transaction out of whole cloth,
but merely took advantage of the tax law (―exploited the loophole‖) to get the
361. Treas. Reg. § 1.1367-1(d)(2) (2007) (emphasis added).
362. Full disclosure: I was a member of the law firm, Chicoine & Hallett, that represented the
taxpayers in Gitlitz from the Tax Court through the Supreme Court. I therefore cannot claim to be
completely objective about the decision issued by the Supreme Court.
363. Indeed, the government took one position in the Tax Court, Nelson v. Comm’r, 110 T.C.
114, 115 (1998), another position in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Gitlitz
v. Comm’r, 182 F.3d 1143, 1148 (10th Cir. 1999), and yet another position in the Supreme Court,
Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 212 n.5. The Tax Court based its decision on one interpretation of the Code,
which the government did not defend on appeal, while the Tenth Circuit‘s decision was grounded on
different reasoning, which the government, again, did not defend in the Supreme Court. See Gitlitz,
531 U.S. at 212 n.5; Gitlitz, 182 F.3d at 1148; Nelson, 110 T.C. at 115. This game of legal whack-amole belies any contention that the law ―clearly‖ disallowed the claimed increase in basis.
364. It is safe to say that Congress did not contemplate this issue one way or another.
365. Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 223 (Breyer, J. dissenting). Justice Breyer cited no authority for
whence this congressional intent was obtained. However, Justice Breyer did cite legislative history
that purported to support the IRS‘s position. Id. at 221 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 103-111, at 624–25
(1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 855–56). However, the House Report cited dealt with
elections by taxpayers to exclude from gross income the discharge of qualified real property business
indebtedness. H.R. REP. NO. 103-111 at 624–25. The House Report did not purport to provide a
general explanation regarding the workings of § 108 in the context of S corporations.
366. See, e.g., Witzel v. Comm‘r, 200 F.3d 496, 497 (7th Cir. 2000) (―It is hard to understand
the rationale for using a tax exemption to avoid taxation not only on the income covered by the
exemption but also on unrelated income that is not tax exempt.‖).
367. For a contrary view, see Cummings, supra note 359, at 865.
368. Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 209.
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most favorable tax treatment for their genuine transaction. Second, Gitlitz is
one of the rare circumstances where the plain meaning of the statute created a
result that was probably not intended by Congress, but there was no language
extant in the Code, regulations, or legislative history from which that intent
could be divined. Indeed, Professor Eustice warned Congress and the
Treasury years before the Gitlitz litigation that the plain reading of the Code
and regulations required the result ultimately reached by the Court. 369
Congress ultimately changed the law, 370 thereby showing its intent (or at least
the intent of that Congress). Accordingly, while I generally disagree with the
notion that encouraging aggressive tax return positions creates a better Code,
Gitlitz might well be one case in which well-advised, risk-tolerant taxpayers
did improve the Code. Regardless, a tax advisor could, prior to the
amendment of § 108, advise a client in good faith that COD income is an item
of income that increases the basis in S corporation stock.
2. ACM Partnership v. Commissioner
In ACM Partnership, the taxpayer, Colgate, entered into a series of
transactions to take advantage of the contingent installment sales
regulations.371 A contingent installment sale is ―a sale or other disposition of
property in which the aggregate selling price cannot be determined by the
close of the taxable year in which such sale or other disposition occurs.‖372
Where the total sales price is contingent on some future event, but the sales
agreement provides a specific period over which payments may be received,
the temporary regulations generally require the taxpayer to allocate a portion
of its basis pro rata over each of the taxable years in which payments are to be
received. 373 The taxpayer‘s income for each year from a contingent
installment sale is therefore the excess of the payments received in that year
over the pro rata portion of the basis allocated to that year.374
The transaction entered into by Colgate was very convoluted and had
numerous steps and players.375 Reduced to its simplest terms, Colgate entered
into a partnership with Merrill Lynch and an offshore bank not subject to U.S.

369. James S. Eustice, Financially Distressed S Corporations, 53 TAX NOTES 97 (1991).
370. Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, § 402, 116 Stat.
21 (2002).
371. 157 F.3d 231, 235–36 (3rd Cir. 1998).
372. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(c) (2007).
373. Id. § 15a.453-1(c)(3).
374. See id.
375. See ACM P’ship, 157 F.3d at 233–38. For an excellent explanation of the transaction, see
Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1943–45. Similar transactions were entered into by the
taxpayers in Saba Partnership v. Commissioner, 273 F.3d 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2001); ASA Investments
Partnership v. Commissioner, 201 F.3d 505, 508–11 (D.C. Cir. 2000); and others.
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tax.376 The bank held an eighty percent interest in the partnership, Colgate
held a nineteen percent interest, and Merrill Lynch held a one percent
interest.377 Each of the parties contributed cash, totaling $175 million, and in
year one, the partnership bought and sold various securities. 378 Ultimately,
but still in year one, the partnership sold $175 million in Citicorp notes and
received in return cash (equal to the cash contributed by the offshore bank)
and new notes, which were to be paid quarterly over a five-year period, and
which had an interest rate that varied each quarter depending upon the London
Interbank Offering Rate (LIBOR) interest rate. 379 Since the amount of the
payments were to vary each year, the transaction was subject (or so the
taxpayer hoped) to the contingent installment sales rules. 380 As a result, the
$175 million basis was required to be recovered ratably over the next five
years.381
In year one, under the contingent installment sales rules, the partnership
used twenty percent of the basis to offset the payments received, which
generated a large gain, eighty percent of which was allocated to the offshore
bank. 382 The bank, of course, did not mind the large amount of gain attributed
to it because it was not subject to tax in the United States.383 The bank‘s
interest in the partnership was then liquidated, and it received back all of the
cash it had contributed.384 This left Colgate with a ninety-nine percent interest
in the partnership and Merrill Lynch with a one percent interest.385
In year two, the partnership sold the LIBOR notes. 386 Under the
contingent installment sales rules, since the contingent sales contract was now
to be closed, the partnership could offset its entire remaining basis against the
amount realized on the sale.387 Not surprisingly, this resulted in a large loss to
the partnership, and ninety-nine percent of the loss was allocated to
Colgate.388 When the dust settled from these transactions, the offshore bank
had a $90 million gain, which again was not subject to U.S. tax, and Colgate

376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.

See ACM P’ship, 157 F.3d at 235.
Id. at 240.
Id.
ACM P‘ship v. Comm‘r, 115 T.C.M. (CCH) 1, 42 (1997).
ACM P’ship, 157 F.3d at 240.
Id.
Id. at 250.
Id. at 242.
Id.
Id. at 244.
Id. at 242.
Id. at 252.
Id. at 252 n.40.
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had a $90 million loss, which of course could be used to offset its U.S. tax
liability.389
While extraordinarily clever, does this transaction reflect a good-faith and
sound construction of the applicable statutory provision, and is the position
consistent with the statute and congressional intent? In my view it is not, and
thus, under the proposed standard a tax advisor could not give a positive
opinion on this transaction. An entire article could be devoted to dissecting
this transaction, and I cannot do it justice here. While the transaction could be
attacked on other grounds, at bottom, this transaction fails for the same reason
Judge Hand disallowed tax-free treatment to Ms. Gregory‘s proposed
reorganization: the installment sale of the notes was not within the purpose of
the statutory definition of a ―sale.‖390 The term ―sale‖ contemplates a bona
fide disposition of property between unrelated parties. A pre-arranged series
of transactions designed to create a tax loss are not the sort of business
transactions contemplated by the terms ―sale‖ or ―installment sale.‖ 391 As the
Tax Court found, the LIBOR note transaction was a mere artifice designed to
create a tax loss:
Each of the steps in the section 453 investment strategy was
planned and arrangements commenced considerably in
advance of execution. Before the negotiations to form ACM,
Merrill had already begun negotiations to purchase the
Citicorp Notes. Before their purchase, Merrill was negotiating
for their disposition. By the time ACM acquired the LIBOR
Notes, Merrill was arranging with Sparekassen the terms on
which some of them would be sold. The contingent payment
sale was scheduled to take place before the end of ACM‘s
first taxable year in order to permit the partnership to spread
its tax basis in the Citicorp Notes over 6 years instead of 5.
The distribution and sale of the BFCE Notes was scheduled to
389. ACM P‘ship v. Comm‘r, 115 T.C.M. (CCH) 1, at 83.
390. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 811 (2d Cir. 1934).
The purpose of the section is plain enough; men engaged in enterprises—
industrial, commercial, financial, or any other—might wish to consolidate, or
divide, to add to, or subtract from, their holdings. Such transactions were not
to be considered as ―realizing‖ any profit, because the collective interests still
remained in solution.
But the underlying presupposition is plain that the
readjustment shall be undertaken for reasons germane to the conduct of the
venture in hand, not as an ephemeral incident, egregious to its prosecution.
Id.
391. See Comm‘r v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945) (―To permit the true nature
of a transaction to be disguised by mere formalisms, which exist solely to alter tax liabilities, would
seriously impair the effective administration of the tax policies of Congress.‖).
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occur before the end of Colgate‘s 1989 taxable year in order
to offset Southampton‘s share of the contingent payment sale
gain on Colgate‘s consolidated return. It was the
understanding of the principals that Kannex would retire from
the partnership by the fall of 1991 so that the LIBOR Notes
could be sold in time for Colgate to carry back the taxable
loss to its 1988 taxable year. No supervening market forces or
other nontax considerations disrupted the scheduled execution
of these steps.392
Therefore, the transaction was not a genuine sale in the sense contemplated by
the statute and thus was not consistent with the language of the statute or
intent of Congress when it enacted the provision. 393
The obvious criticism of this conclusion is that it is really no different
from the court‘s determination in ACM Partnership that the transaction lacked
economic substance. Admittedly, in many respects, the factors and the
analysis are the same. Both the proposed standard and the economic
substance look at the nature of the transaction and not whether the transaction
superficially satisfied the language of the statute. And there is a certain ―I
know it when I see it‖ aspect to the conclusion that a pre-ordained set of
transactions between accommodating parties is not a true sale. But the crucial
distinction is that the proposed standard does not look outside the language
and the purpose of the statute at issue to find the answer, while employing the
economic substance doctrine requires the use of ―an overriding legal
principle, superimposed upon the whole of revenue law without regard to the
language or purpose of any particular provision.‖394
As I hope I have shown, the selective invocation of the economic
substance and business purpose doctrines is problematic. What the analysis of
the ACM Partnership transaction does show is that a standard that focuses on
the text and the purposes of the statute can be used to limit shelters and other

392. ACM P’ship, 115 T.C.M. (CCH) at 139–41. The court cited the IRS‘s expert witness, who
testified that:
[T]he transactions and the returns were the result of a carefully crafted and
faithfully executed sequence of sophisticated and costly financial maneuvers
that left little to chance or market opportunities. The score for the Partnership‘s
actions was very detailed and the libretto even included the writing of the
minutes of the Partnership meetings weeks before those meetings occurred.
Id. at 140 n.26.
393. Compare a Subchapter S election, which admittedly is only done to avoid corporate-level
taxes. However, making such an election to avoid taxes is clearly contemplated within the language
and purpose of the statute.
394. MacNiven v. Westmoreland Invs. Ltd. [2001] UKHL 6, [2003] 1 A.C. 311, ¶ 29 (UKHC).
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abusive transactions. The proposed standard was not designed to deal
specifically with tax shelters, but was intended as a standard of broad
application that would encourage legitimate tax advice. If we can base the
standard on the language and purpose of the statute and still restrain shelters,
the debate has, in my view, moved in the right direction.
E. The Role of the Bar
If the current bottling of the tax shelter brine has taught us anything it is
that the IRS cannot solve the shelter problem without the help of the bar and
tax professionals in general. Professor Eustice noted the efficacy of enlisting
the tax bar,395 and others have noted the bar‘s key role in these matters.396 The
enforcement budget is insufficient for the government to ever fully win the tax
shelter war.397 The bar must therefore recognize its role as both the cause of
the problem and as part of the solution. 398 The tax shelter boom and related
problems could not have occurred without lawyers and accountants. 399 Thus,
if tax professionals and taxpayers are stymied by the government‘s actions in
this area, we have ourselves primarily to blame.
The tax bar can, of course, adhere to its position that the filing of a tax
return is the first step in an adversary proceeding and that tax lawyers may
advocate any position that has just a realistic possibility of succeeding. 400 But
if we do so, we must follow the lead of Mark Johnson and ask ourselves: ―Are
we sentimentally defending an outworn morality with anachronistic
shibboleths? Or, worse, are we cynically defending a code of convenience as

395. Eustice, supra note 130, at 164.
396. See, e.g., Schizer, supra note 8, at 369.
397. I am not as sanguine about this as Pamela Olson, who stated, ―The tax shelter war is over.
The government won.‖ Pamela F. Olson, Now That You’ve Caught the Bus, What Are You Going to
Do With It? Observations from the Frontlines, the Sidelines, and Between the Lines, So to Speak, 60
TAX LAW. 567, 567 (2007).
398. Matthew Ames noted:
Changing the ethics of tax advisors and return preparers is such a collateral
method [of altering taxpayer ethics]; the less willing a tax advisor is to go along
with a scheme, the less likely the client is to embark on it. ―[T]he tax
practitioner plays a dominant and most responsible role. His attitude becomes
the attitude of his clients, his basic honesty becomes their standard of
comparison, his sense of morality becomes a guide to them, for they feel that
others are abiding by the same high or low standard.‖
Ames, supra note 350, at 411 (quoting Merle H. Miller, Morality in Tax Planning, 10 N.Y.U. ANN.
INST. ON FED. TAX ‘N 1067, 1083 (1952)).
399. Ames, supra note 350, at 426 (―For a supposedly self-regulating profession to wash its
hands of a problem of which it is an intimate part is shameful.‖).
400. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‘l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985).
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the product of sacred professional obligations?‖401 The bar must also
recognize that there is no guarantee that the reliance on the advice of a
professional as a defense to tax penalties will or should continue. And
without the reliance defense, taxpayers will be less likely to obtain—and pay
for—the advice of lawyers and accountants. Professor Weisbach has
convincingly argued that there is nothing immutable about the current system
of penalties and the reliance defense. 402 Indeed, Congress has already enacted
one penalty (§ 6707A)403 and proposed another (as part of the codification of
the economic substance doctrine)404 for which reliance on the advice of a
professional is not a defense. Moreover, other areas of the law, including
environmental law and securities law, do not permit people to avoid civil
penalties by relying on the advice of counsel. Thus, tax advisors must
recognize their central role as gatekeepers and their duty to the system, 405 if
not for the sake of the system, then at least for the sake of their own
livelihood.406
V. CONCLUSION
The government‘s desire to ―do something‖ about the tax shelter problem
is understandable. However, in attempting to fix the shelter problem,
Congress and the Treasury should not make legitimate tax advice and
legitimate tax planning more difficult. The tax system is based on voluntary
compliance, which requires a well-informed and well-advised citizenry. In
addition, the rules and standards for tax advice should encourage tax planning
to be legitimate. The general standard for tax advice must be understandable
and straightforward. Moreover, it must promote advice that hews as close to
the intent of Congress as possible. Basing the standard on a true construction
of the statute, rather than a chance of success, has the greatest chance of
accomplishing that goal.

401. Johnson, supra note 37, at 25.
402. Weisbach, supra note 6, at 221.
403. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6707A (West 2007).
404. See, e.g., Abusive Tax Shelter Shutdown and Taxpayer Accountability Act of 2007, H.R.
2345, 110th Cong. § 101 (2007).
405. See, e.g., Darrell, supra note 26, at 131; Schizer, supra note 8, at 370–71.
406. Ames, supra note 350, at 427.
The current self-assessment system relies on the integrity of taxpayers and
tax advisors for its success. It is currently in trouble, at least partly because that
integrity is lacking. The profession must at least attempt to mitigate the
problem by protecting that integrity. By exercising leadership, lawyers may
perform a valuable service for themselves and for society.
Id. (footnote omitted).

